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Call for Articles
New England Journal of Entrepreneurship (NEJE), published twice a year by Sacred Heart University’s College of Business,
is intended to be an invaluable forum for exchange of scholarly ideas, practices, and policies in the field of entrepreneurship
and small business management.
The Journal is currently seeking original contributions that have not been published or are under consideration elsewhere.
The scope of the articles published in NEJE ranges from theoretical/conceptual to empirical research, with maximum rele-
vance to practicing entrepreneurs.The Journal tries to appeal to a broad range of audience, so articles submitted should be
written in such a manner that those outside of academics would be able to comprehend and appreciate the content of the
material.
Format
Please submit four typed copies of your article, plus a CD-based version in Word or RTF format. On separate pages, include an
abstract of the article (100 words maximum) and a biographical sketch of the author(s).A title page should precede the arti-
cle and should list the name(s) of the author(s) as well as their full address (including phone and fax numbers and e-mail
address). Papers are to be double-spaced with one-inch margins. References should be included on separate pages at the end
of the paper. Manuscripts should be no longer than 20 pages of text and 25 pages total, including abstract, text, tables or illus-
trations, notes and works cited. Please consult APA style guidelines for all formatting details.
Copyright
The copyright of published articles will belong to the publishers of NEJE. Authors will be granted permission to reprint or
otherwise use portions of their articles published in the Journal upon written request.
Review Process
All articles will be double blind refereed.Authors will receive reviewers’ comments and the editors’ publishing decision in
approximately 90 days of submission.
All prospective authors are required to include a $20 submission fee with each manuscript sent in for consideration, payable
to “NEJE.”The fee will be used to cover administrative costs and will also provide the author with a year’s subscription to the
Journal.
Submission
Authors are encouraged to submit articles for the Fall 2005 issue by April 15, 2005. Papers received after the due date will
automatically be considered for future issues of the journal.
All submissions and correspondence should be addressed to:







Please visit our web page at www.sacredheart.edu/cb/neje or email us at shuartj@sacredheart.edu.
Sample Copies
Sample copies of the previous issues will be available from the Editor on a first-come, first-served basis.
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From the Editors
We are pleased to announce that Dr. Gary Castrogiovanni, Professor of Management at
the University of Tulsa,Tulsa, Oklahoma, has received the second annual Best Reviewer
Award from this journal. Gary’s tireless efforts on behalf of the NEJE have been ongoing
for the past six years.We appreciate his dedication to our publication and to the field of
academic research in entrepreneurship.
As is typical of our (still young) journal,we offer diverse reading material for your inter-
est.We begin with two interviews of entrepreneurs in very different arenas: one is just
getting started in the importation of fine European glassware, while the other has six
years under his belt as a niche player within the telecommunications field.Both entrepre-
neurs exemplify the kind of person who excels as his/her own boss: they are driven self-
motivators who constantly strive to grow their business and get better every day.
We follow with two refereed articles and a refereed case study. Should you wish to
obtain the instructor’s manual for the case, please contact the authors directly; this infor-
mation is provided at the end of the case study.
As is now common practice, Joe Levangie, of our editorial staff, has conjured up anoth-
er arresting piece on the types of things entrepreneurs must do well in order to succeed.
We believe that we best serve our readers by providing a mix of academic,as well as prac-
titioner, points-of-view in the Journal.
Finally, we announced in our last issue a special issue for spring 2005 on “Measurement
Issues in Entrepreneurship” under the Guest Editor leadership of Dr. Jill Kickul of the
Simmons School of Management. It looks like the special issue will appear in Fall 2005.
The Journal’s editorial staff continues to welcome your comments and reactions to our
bi-annual publication wherein we provide a forum for the best manuscripts we receive
from our international audience.
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NEJE: Starting an import business from “scratch”
requires a remarkable energy level. What prepared
you for this work?
Gooding: I grew up near London with a father who had a
thriving import business bringing in high-end tableware from
the European continent. He sold these goods to British retail-
ers who could appreciate the quality of the imports and find
the right audience for them. I worked my way up in the com-
pany starting from the warehouse and ending up selling my
family’s product line to the finest upscale clients we had at
the time.
NEJE: Why not stay in England and build on that suc-
cess?
Gooding: I could have, I suppose, but becoming an entre-
preneur in America intrigued me. I decided to attend college
in the States to learn more about life in the United States. I’d
been inspired by the “sky’s-the -limit” thinking here—com-
pared to Europe where the business culture is less daring,
the taxes are considerably higher, and the chance to become
wealthy is much more difficult.
NEJE: So your story began once you graduated col-
lege?
Gooding: In a way, yes. I graduated from Hobart College in
1993. That experience gave me plenty of things to say at
cocktail parties, but it didn’t have any specific application to
my future life as an entrepreneur. I got a position with
MacKenzie - Childs, a high-end tableware company located in
the States, and stayed with them for one year traveling
around the country making connections with buyers from
such stores as Neiman-Marcus and Bergdorf Goodman. This
was important because it would later lay the foundation for
me to go to these same stores and sell them my own line of
goods.
NEJE: Is that when you went on your own?
Gooding: I quit MacKenzie and felt at age 24 that I needed
to venture out on my own.Call it hubris,but coming from an
entrepreneurial family, I felt I was ready.
NEJE: Were you?
Gooding: Yes and no. Yes, because I was able to pick up
several European tableware lines as their commissioned
sales representative in the United States after attending
trade fairs in Paris, London and Italy. I asked for, and
received, exclusive rights to represent these companies for
five years. Imagine, at age 24, with little personal business
experience of my own, talking to executives from corpora-
tions and individual artisans throughout Europe and con-
vincing them to trust me!  
I am absolutely at heart a salesperson through and
through.The thrill of the hunt, so to speak, drives me con-
stantly. I won’t take “no” for an answer so at a tender age,
there I was representing these upscale manufacturers to
U.S. retailers.
NEJE: However, getting to the “no” part of your “yes
and no” answer means?
Gooding: Every retailer I went to loved the goods I had to
offer.They gave me substantial orders and I believed I was
on my way. However, the tough part came when the retail-
ers attempted to turn around and sell this merchandise to
the end customer. The prices the retailers sought were so
high that buyers balked.The inventory sat, and while it sat, I
couldn’t sell in more product. I spent five years under the
banner of “Penshurst Trading” trying as hard as I could to
work with these retailers and increase their product
turnover, but to no avail.
Those five years, though, gave me a great opportunity to
really learn the American market. I have traveled to every
major retail city in the States, as well to outlying suburbs,and
got to know hundreds of key retail buyers. Importantly, I also
got to learn what the American consumer was looking for;
what they’ll buy and what they won’t. That knowledge
proved to be invaluable.
NEJE: You were close to 30 years old at that point,
treading water and…?
Gooding: I needed to find a product line where the per-
ceived value was better, the prices certainly lower, and the
Juliska: Filling a Niche with Imports
David Gooding, CEO
Juliska, Inc.
D avid and Capucine Gooding are completingtheir third year in business, directing the grow-ing activities of their import business located in
Stamford, Connecticut. Their niche is marketing hand-
blown glass which is historically accurate and inspired by
such disparate designs as 14th-century French, 16th-centu-
ry Dutch, and 19th-century Venetian glassware. We inter-
viewed David on a “quiet” day when the phones didn’t
seem to be ringing constantly.
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product story stronger in order to succeed in the United
States.
Capucine had the good fortune of working a Paris trade
fair in 2000. She had been employed by Martha Stewart with
one of her enterprises called the Wedding List. My wife has
a keen fashion eye and came across a booth where a hus-
band and wife team, the Bollens, were representing a coop-
erative of Czech glass blowers who all lived near Prague.
They had only 40 pieces to show, but the product was daz-
zling. Capucine was blown away, as it were, by the merchan-
dise.
I happened to be with Capucine in Paris during the trade
fair and we immediately began negotiations with Juliska
Bollen about taking over their sales in the United States. At
the time, they were only generating revenue of roughly
$100,000 annually in America among just 10 retailers, but
they were content with that.They believed the market was
saturated. We saw much more potential and offered them
$100,000 for the right to deal directly with the glass blowers,
design our own collections, and sell exclusively in the U.S.
market.
NEJE: What happened next?
Gooding: I went to Prague and had to convince these Old
World, very talented people that I was a long-term player
who was going to build a large and reliable source of
orders for them. I had convinced the Bollens, but selling
myself to the glass blowers was a whole different experi-
ence. I said that, under my sales leadership and with my
wife designing goods for the American marketplace, we
could expand their product line from 40 items to 400
within three years.
And we’ve done it.
NEJE: It’s one thing to have a vision and promise to
deliver, quite another to accomplish what you set out
to do.
Gooding: Tell me about it. Life over the past three years has
been incredibly hectic, but it has also been incredibly fulfill-
ing.The most important decision we had to make was our
market positioning with the glassware.We decided to name
the product line after Mrs. Bollen because her first name,
Juliska, was elegant sounding and we wanted to honor her
for initially finding the Czech artisans and culling their prod-
uct line for the Paris show.
Each piece is signed with the Juliska brand name and we
sell only to premium-priced retailers like Neiman-Marcus.We
absolutely will not sell to anyone, such as Macy’s or
Bloomingdale’s, who are known to discount their product
prices. Our positioning is clear:The product is truly unusual,
fills a consumer need,and is priced a bit below existing com-
petitive products to give Juliska an edge in terms of per-
ceived price/value benefit. We strive and strive for quality.
We currently destroy 40 percent of what the Czech cooper-
ative sends us because we believe it isn’t up to our stan-
dards. We expect that figure to decrease substantially over
the years as the glass blowers and we get used to doing busi-
ness together. But we absolutely will not ship any product
that does not pass our strict quality-control oversight.
NEJE: What are your end-consumer demographics?
Gooding:Young brides,certainly,but we like to think we also
appeal to practical people with great taste. These are more
creative buyers, usually women, who are looking for some-
thing different, something new.They love antiques and want
things in their homes that have a certain Old World,European
charm to them.Age as a demographic seems to be irrelevant;
it is the taste level that creates a commonality among our
retailers’ customers. They’re not looking for something pre-
cious; they’re looking for beauty and functionality at the same
time.
Our slogan for Juliska is,“Quite possibly the most beauti-
ful glass in the world.” I got the inspiration for that tag line
from seeing Carlsberg Beer commercials.The brewery boast-
ed it offered “quite possibly the best lager in the world.”
Well, if they could do that for beer, we could do it for glass!
When prospective buyers see our goods at retail, they antic-
ipate finding a price point comparable to say, Waterford
Crystal.We surprise them by using a penetration price level
of roughly 30 percent less than competitive product. That
closes the sale—beauty and function at a very fair price.
NEJE: Looking over your product catalog, the
effort to establish Juliska in the United States that
you and your wife have accomplished is certainly
impressive, but it must be exhausting and anxiety-
producing. Your capital is constantly at risk and
there is no guarantee you’ll ultimately be successful.
Gooding: Can’t argue with you on that score, but let’s look
at it from our point of view.There are nearly 300 million peo-
ple living in the United States. Discretionary income is huge.
I came to this country with the aspiration to be a success
and we’ve found a great niche to sell in. I have no family
money in this business, but I do have a great relationship
with several local banks.
We’ve increased our revenues by almost 2500 percent in
three years. By the end of this calendar year, I estimate our
receipts will be more than $2.2 million, and we’ve just
received our first substantial order from Neiman-Marcus.
Next year, for 2005, I hope to ship more than $3 million in
product.We are carried in 600 to 700 stores across the coun-
try, with 90 percent of that total, small independent stores
where the proprietor’s name is on the front of the door.
These owners take great pride in what they sell and their
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image is tied in with every item that goes out the door.That’s
what makes our company’s emphasis on quality and strictly
holding the line on price so vital to continuing to do busi-
ness with them.
I can anticipate your next question, so I’ll answer it for
you. Have we shown a decent profit yet? No.When you cut
your margins to the bone, profit generation is put off until
you achieve a certain momentum in the marketplace. We
intend to reach that level soon.
Do we still borrow from friends and use our business
lines with the banks to support our rapid growth curve? Yes.
My personal goal is to either have sales of $10 million
annually by the year 2010 or else get bought out by some-
one for $10 million by then. I want to live the good life,
and either way, in another five years or so I expect to have
earned it.
NEJE: During our discussion today, you’ve never
mentioned something very dear to the hearts of mar-
keters—the use of market research to confirm their
observations about what customers want. How
come?
Gooding: I didn’t need to underwrite market research.
With our funds so stretched as it was, my wife and I, with
design help from one of our employees, Elaine McCleary,
have taken care of every significant decision and detail the
business has required. We have used an outside photogra-
pher for our product shots, but other than that, we have
designed everything, done all the traveling to the Czech
Republic, arranged all the importing, created our own
advertising and placed the media buys.We look for public-
ity constantly and send out our own publicity pieces every
day to the top magazines in the field including Food &
Wine, Metro Home, El Décor, House Beautiful and Town
& Country.We constantly get asked for product samples to
include in their content articles and all we ask for is prod-
uct credits.The magazine editors love our product line and
we get orders based on retailers seeing our goods in the
magazines.
NEJE: How long can you keep up this pace?
Gooding: As long as I need to. I don’t like to be told by any-
one that I can’t do something. I don’t need or yearn for any-
one else’s approval, nor do I need a pat on the back.What I
do need is to build something concrete, something I can
look back and say with pride, that I built that business. I’m
driven to create and invent every day. I love the buzz of
orders coming in and I enjoy working in this industry.
Working with creative people like my wife, and with Elaine,
working with creative retailers to build their businesses and
others, this isn’t work—it’s fun.
I also want to make a lot of money.
NEJE: How do you cope with the anxiety of running a
growing, dynamic business?
Gooding: I don’t think of the issues that arise at work as ways
to generate some internal type of worry or anxiety. I see every-
thing that happens as an opportunity. Selling is in my blood so
I sell like crazy.There’s always a way to get to “yes”and to have
people see dealing with Juliska as a “win-win” situation. If I
were still in Europe,there’d be too many factors out of my con-
trol. The government, local and European Union laws, taxes,
business restrictions—I’d go out of my mind. In the United
States, there is so much more potential for businesspeople
who care and are thoughtful in how they approach their busi-
ness.The problem is, people don’t care enough to spend the
time and effort to make their businesses succeed.
The other thing that’s quite important to me is integrity.
We honor all of our commitments. We have solid relation-
ships with our retail accounts and they appreciate how hard
we work on providing the best customer service we can.
We’ve just added our sixth employee,Anne, whose job it is
to keep in touch with our 50 commissioned sales represen-
tatives in the field as well as our retail accounts.
I’m learning to delegate some of my work, but the one
thing I won’t delegate is any part of the sales contacts we
need to keep up. Sales represent our revenue stream and no
entrepreneur who wishes to be successful should ever dele-
gate that work even if you have a sales manager. You can
spend a day a week strategizing, but the other four days the
owner must be totally involved in the business.
Relationships are fragile and that’s why I will always be the
one making sure our retail relationships stay strong.
NEJE: Do you anticipate any threats to your strong
growth curve?
Gooding: I suppose at some point we can expect to see
knock-offs of our product line entering the distribution
chain, but I can’t see another company matching our quali-
ty at the price points we have established.
We might need a full-time CFO at some point to guide our
financials. If we don’t select someone very good, I imagine
our bottom line could be affected. That is something we
need to think about within the next year.
It’s also hard to put a lid on expenses when business is
growing so fast. I try hard to do that, but it isn’t always easy.
There’s also no model for success that I can pull off the
shelf and use as a guide everyday. Something new comes up
and I have to use my existing skill set to solve the problem
and create a new opportunity for us. I’ve just joined a group
of entrepreneurs who meet once a month to bounce ideas off
one another. I sure wish I had found this group earlier; I could
have avoided some costly mistakes. It’s not exactly lonely at
the top, but it sure can be frustrating not to have someone to
listen to your ideas and give you feedback about whether it
NEJE INTERVIEW 9
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makes sense or not. Having a sounding board is invaluable.
NEJE: What if you ever got sick? Do you have any con-
tingency plans in place for such an emergency?
Gooding: I don’t plan on getting sick. With such a small
staff, we don’t have the luxury of fielding a contingency
plan, at least not for the moment.
NEJE: What are some words to describe who you are?
Gooding: I would say driven, ambitious, passionate, enthusi-
astic, impulsive, honest, risk - taker, an outside - the -box
thinker, someone who enjoys empowering others and
watching them succeed, and enthusiastic. I don’t want to
spend my time thinking or dwelling on the downside. I get
real enjoyment out of putting together a creative team and
watching them come up with great solutions. I’m a leader,
but I certainly don’t need to get all the credit for being suc-
cessful. Success is a team effort.
—L.W.
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NEJE: What is your new venture called and what are
your roles in it?
Murphy: The company is called Global Linking Solutions, or
GLS.We’re a managed network and security provider and I’m
the president and COO.We’re a small company so I get to do
a little bit of everything.An important part of my responsibil-
ities is focusing on setting the strategic direction for GLS.That
means developing and shaping a sound business plan and
constantly adjusting to the ever-changing marketplace.
I also get to work in a number of tactical areas such as
sales, financial operations, marketing, engineering, product
development, systems development, process engineering,
staffing, and even cleaning up after our Friday staff lunch.
My partner and I started this company from scratch in
1999 and now we have about 50 employees. All of our sys-
tems have been built internally and I am part of the team that
guides the development of our tools and processes, which in
a service business means you’re going “24/7.”
NEJE: What was the path you took to get you where
you are today?
Murphy: I was working for AT&T in South Florida when I
met Michael Scanlon. Mike supported my team as the Data
Technical Manager and he helped my group win some very
significant accounts. Mike and I both felt there was a big
need in the marketplace for someone who could do a good
job of building networks for clients. Most of the integrators
and solutions-providers looked at the wide area network as
just an add-on to their regular business and they weren’t
very good at designing and implementing the wide area net-
work.The carriers didn’t understand customer solutions and
were not very skilled in implementing networking and secu-
rity equipment.
Mike and I decided to build a company that would design
and build data networks and we were going to do it better
than anyone else. We had had a high success rate within
AT&T, but we knew there were constraints on what we
could offer and how fast we could deliver on client needs.
In 1999, Mike and I left AT&T determined to build our
own company and make it more nimble and responsive to
client requirements.
NEJE: What did you do for capital?
Murphy: We developed a strong business plan and started to
look for funding. Fortunately, we didn’t have to look very far.
Mike’s dad, Jack Scanlon, already well known as a leader in
the telecommunications industry, decided to fund our start-
up company and we were literally off to the races.
We started to implement our business plan in July 1999.
One of our first moves was to hire away four other AT&T
executives so we could start attacking the marketplace
aggressively. Lucky for us we didn’t know what we could or
couldn’t do! We were confident we had identified an impor-
tant market niche. GLS won some pretty big accounts right
away.
NEJE: Was it a case of beginner’s luck?
Murphy: No, we had put together the right mix of service
products and people to make a go of it long term.
Howwever, we realized after a year in business that the serv-
ice mix we provided,especially if we sold a carrier-only deal,
was becoming commoditized.That meant that GLS was not
“sticky” enough. There was no reason for our clients to
remain loyal to us.We knew we would have to do something
different in the data networking market—something value
added—so that we would become more important and dif-
ferentiated from our competitors.
We decided to seek additional funding to build a Network
Operations Center that would allow us to offer a suite of
managed network and security services. In October 2000,
we launched three new offerings: Managed Frame Relay,
Managed Virtual Private Networks (VPN) and Managed
Firewall.
Slowly, but surely, we started to gain new clients and hold
on to our existing ones.
NEJE: Who are your main competitors?
Murphy: GLS is a small, managed wide area network
provider; this means we have two different sets of competi-
tors. First, we compete against the likes of AT&T, Qwest,
MCI, and the Bell operating companies in the Managed
The Values of Being Small and Nimble
Peter Christian Murphy
P eter Christian (Chris) Murphy had worked hisway up the “food chain” at AT&T for 19 years,culminating in his position as Sales Center
Vice President for South Florida. When he and a
coworker realized there was an opportunity in the
marketplace for a small, nimble company to take
advantage of emerging communications technology
that a stodgy, lumbering corporation would have
trouble integrating into its service package, Chris
decided to jump into an entrepreneurial opportunity.
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Frame Relay and VPN market segments.Those are the “big
guns.” In the VPN arena, there is another group of special-
ized and smaller companies that we compete against
including Netifice, Clearpath, Virtella, Megapath, and
Aubeta.
NEJE: And then there’s tiny GLS.
Murphy: Exactly. For a small company to succeed, you
must clearly distinguish yourself from everyone else. GLS
differentiates itself against the high-end companies, like
AT&T, with managed offers that match up well on a feature-
functionality basis, but at a much more reasonable price.
Since we are a much smaller company than an AT&T, we
can also be more flexible. Customers are very appreciative
when solutions are custom tailored to their needs rather
than taken “off the shelf.” Our customers also like the fact
that they are important to us and have easy access to every-
one who works for GLS.That sure beats sitting on hold and
getting the runaround at one of the big customer care
bureaucracies.
In the VPN arena, we compete with a bunch of niche VPN
providers.They have all invested in building their networks
to deliver VPN capabilities at reasonable prices.We find we
are usually very similar in pricing to these niche folks and
sometimes their offerings even approach GLS on feature-
functionality.
NEJE: So it’s harder to make yourself seem different
and better.
Murphy: The difference between us and the other VPN
players is we are also trying to manage a private network
to deliver service.These small companies have to use their
best resources looking internally at their own network
infrastructures and not on their customers.
Additionally, when GLS builds a network, we use top-
quality research components from the leading DSL busi-
ness customers, such as Covad, New Edge, and the Bell
Companies. Since we use only the best (and most expen-
sive) network components, the diversity, redundancy, and
reliability with a GLS VPN network will always be far supe-
rior to those competitors of ours who cannot afford, or do
not choose, to use these best-in-class components.
We don’t own the network and none of the traffic is
dependent on GLS infrastructure, so the client doesn’t
have to worry about our solvency as a company. If there
were concerns or fears about our corporate solvency, that
could put the client’s entire network at risk. Literally, if we
owned the network and stopped functioning, the cus-
tomer’s network could vanish. That’s critical, because sev-
eral of our closest competitors appear to be losing money
with their business model while GLS has turned a profit
each of the last three years.
NEJE: Even with these advantages, was there one day
when you knew you had broken through the compet-
itive “clutter” and you were on your way?
Murphy: Yes! Our big break came in early 2001 when we
sold a fully managed DSL VPN to Domino’s Pizza. At that
time, I don’t think you could have found a DSL VPN, so we
had an early position as the market leader. As one might
expect, we learned lots of lessons with our Domino’s
client, and that’s truly the case when you are pioneering a
new market segment. DSL VPN has been a great boon for
our company and we continue today to manage some very
large retailers.We now have DSL providers working with us
to deliver our managed VPN services over their own DSL
circuits.
Our managed services business has grown, GLS became
profitable in 2002 and continues to be profitable today. In
October 2003, GLS self-funded a move to a new 15,000-
square-foot facility, which includes a diesel generator to pro-
tect against black- and brown-outs, an OC48 ring, and new
furniture and computers for our NOC. We continue to add
new tools and we have rolled out a whole new suite of man-
aged servers and security products. It seems like we have
come a long way, but I feel we are just getting started. In
2005, we will begin offering our services to the federal gov-
ernment, having just been approved by the GSA.
NEJE: That’s all very impressive. Are there certain
people or events in your life that you can look back to
and credit with helping you become so successful?
Murphy: I was about nine years old when I went to this cow-
boy camp with a friend of mine.We had a lot of fun riding hors-
es and doing cowboy “stuff.” Well,what I didn’t know was this
was a Christian cowboy camp and we were required to go to
church every night. Anyway, I was away from home for the
first time in my life and I guess I was a little lonely and home-
sick.They had a preacher there and he introduced me to this
carpenter who has watched over me and guided me ever
since.I may have ignored Him and His advice for periods of my
life, but I strive to work for Him and for my family.
NEJE: What was the biggest break you ever got before
starting GLS?
Murphy: I guess it was when AT&T promoted me to run the
South Florida operation. I got to live at the beach in Fort
Lauderdale for seven years and gain some great work expe-
rience that prepared me for entering the entrepreneurial
world.
NEJE: Would you say you also had great disappoint-
ments?
Murphy: I wish I had become an entrepreneur much earli-
er in life. Not only have I learned so much about business
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and life every day, but also, I would have earned millions if
we had started GLS during the “dot com” boom.
NEJE: What impact did your education have on your
success?
Murphy: I was not academically inclined and actually took
18 months off from college to mature some before graduat-
ing from Ramapo College in New Jersey. I joined AT&T right
out of college as a sales representative and they put me
through three months of training where they taught me
about sales. As you might expect, I learned a whole lot of
stuff that really wasn’t all that important. I think that every-
thing I have learned of any lasting importance, I learned on
the job. You have to experiment with ideas that you think
will work, you have to try and make them work and then
rework them and try again.
When an idea works the way you want it to work, you
have to make sure you are getting the most mileage out of
that idea. If one of your ideas doesn’t appear to be success-
ful, and you have tried to rework it a few times, you need to
quit trying to fix it and spend time on things that are work-
ing or begin to implement new ideas.
NEJE: Is there anything you would change in your life
if you could go back in time?
Murphy: As a said earlier, I would have become my own
boss much sooner. In fact, I should have been an entrepre-
neur right after college. While I learned a lot working for
“Mr. Big,” I think I could have learned a lot more and a lot
faster enrolled in the “entrepreneurial school of hard
knocks.”
NEJE: How about some of the jobs you had growing
up and how they shaped you as a person?
Murphy: My first job was actually an entrepreneurial posi-
tion as a clam digger on Long Beach Island. I was 13 years
old and I had a 14-foot aluminum boat that I would take out
and clam for four or five hours, then sell the clams I dug up
at the fish market for two cents apiece.
My life lesson from that job was to concentrate on the
work at hand and not to let sharks scare you! I also had a job
as a kid running the bumper cars at an amusement park, run-
ning an ice cream parlor, and I was even the head chef for a
time at a gourmet restaurant. I learned how to lead a team,
how important it is for everyone to feel empowered in a
team, and how crucial it is to find an efficient process and
then stick with it.
I also made a lot of friends at work and always tried to
have fun even when there was pressure. Matter of fact, the
more pressure on us, the more fun we had and it’s the same
way today.
NEJE: What was your family upbringing like?
Murphy: I was adopted as a baby by two loving parents. I
was taught to be honest, help those less fortunate than me,
and to work hard. I was also taught to have fun when I
worked because work without fun is just a burden.
NEJE: Where do you see yourself going in the future?
Murphy: When I was part of the corporate world, I always
thought about when I would no longer have to work. I
haven’t really considered my long-range plans, but I will be
open to going wherever the Lord leads me. Am I content
with my job? Well, I have a great job now because I get to do
a little of everything and I am always learning. I am continu-
ally challenged and I work with a great group of people. I
use the word “content” because I think we should always be
able to do things quicker and better. I will say that I do enjoy
my work and I feel blessed.
NEJE: What’s in store for GLS?
Murphy: I see GLS really growing into a significant compa-
ny in the not-too-distant future. We are in a growing field,
especially where network security is concerned. That
growth curve should continue to expand significantly dur-
ing the next decade. As long as we continue to provide inno-
vative, managed solutions that solve real problems, and offer
tremendous value, we will be the kind of company that
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An abundance of research has addressed the importance of
entrepreneurial performance.The consequences of entrepre-
neurial performance are important to society at large
(Kirchoff and Phillips 1988) and to individual entrepreneurs
and their associates (Cooper 1993).Therefore, understanding
entrepreneurial performance and its measurement are criti-
cal issues (Chandler and Hanks 1993; Murphy et al. 1996).
Kanter and Brinkerhoff (1981) argue that performance meas-
urement issues are fundamental to understanding organiza-
tions and that what is measured is as important as how it is
measured.
This article seeks to contribute to the literature by focus-
ing on satisfaction with performance, a seldom studied, yet
important aspect of entrepreneurial performance (Cooper
and Artz 1995).This research contributes to the existing liter-
ature in two important ways. First, considerable debate exists
in the entrepreneurship literature regarding the equivalency
of objective and subjective measures of performance.
Satisfaction with aspects of entrepreneurial performance in
particular have been proposed and used as objective meas-
ure surrogates (Covin and Covin 1990; Covin and Slevin,
1990;Covin et al.1990;Gupta and Govindarajan 1984;Naman
and Slevin 1993).Therefore, one objective of this study is to
offer insight as to the equivalency of satisfaction with per-
formance with relatively more objective, parallel measures of
entrepreneurial performance. Second, satisfaction with per-
formance is an important measure of entrepreneurial per-
formance in its own right (Cooper and Artz 1995), independ-
ent of its equivalency, or lack of equivalency, with more
objective measures. Satisfaction with performance, or the
lack thereof, likely impacts important investment and contin-
uance decisions by the entrepreneur (Cooper and Artz
1995). In this sense, satisfaction with performance in the
short term may likely lead to the more objective measures of
performance in the long term.The second objective of this
article then, is to investigate factors that likely explain vari-
ance in satisfaction with performance.
Objective and Subjective Measures 
Obtaining objective performance data for entrepreneurial
firms is a difficult task because private firms are typically not
required to disclose their financial position and have little
incentive to do so (Dess and Robinson 1984; Sapienza et al.
1988). As a result, secondary data sources rarely include in-
depth performance information on entrepreneurial firms.
The issue is further complicated by the fact that asking for
sensitive or difficult information on surveys may reduce
response rates (Dillman et al. 1993), making primary data
gathering more difficult.To overcome these liabilities, many
researchers have suggested the use of subjective perform-
ance measures as an acceptable alternative to using objective
performance measures (Dess and Robinson 1984; Gupta and
Govindarajan 1984).The equivalency and appropriateness of
using subjective measures,as opposed to objective measures,
has been debated in the academic literature in general and in
the entrepreneurship literature in particular.
Two particular articles have strongly encouraged the use
of subjective measures as surrogates for objective measures
of performance.Dess and Robinson (1984) argued that in the
absence of objective data,an accurate assessment of firm per-
formance could be obtained by asking respondents to subjec-
tively compare the performance of their firm to the perform-
ance of immediate competitors. Gupta and Govindarajan
(1984) provided an alternative approach, arguing that firm
performance could be subjectively inferred by considering
respondents’ stated importance of and satisfaction with a
variety of performance measures. Support for the relevance
of subjective measures is usually based on correlation analy-
sis.For example,Dess and Robinson (1984), found self-report-
ed sales levels and average return on assets to be positively
Doing Well and Happy About It? 




T he importance of performance measurement islargely undisputed. There is debate, however,regarding the equivalency of objective and subjec-
tive performance measures.This debate has not considered
a frequently used subjective measure, satisfaction with per-
formance, to be an important measure independent of its
equivalency with objective measures. Using a sample of
368 manufacturing firms, this study found that objective
measures explained only a modest amount of variance in
satisfaction with performance and that other variables
added significantly to the explained variance.These factors
included perceived environmental hostility, vulnerability,
perceived competitive advantage, and commitment.
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correlated with subjective assessments of sales and average
return on assets respectively for their sample of 26 firms in
the paint and allied products industry. In researching joint
ventures, Geringer and Hebert (1991) and Glaister and
Buckley (1998) found objective and subjective performance
measures to be positively correlated.
However, other studies have not supported the proposed
equivalency of subjective and objective measures (Chandler
and Hanks 1993; Deeds et al. 1998; Sapienza et al. 1988).
Sapienza et al. (1988) attempted to replicate Dess and
Robinson’s results, but were unable to do so. Although
Sapienza et al.’s study also had a small sample size (34), they
found no significant correlations between objective measures
of performance (sales growth and return on sales) and their
proposed subjective equivalents. Arguably the most in-depth
study on the equivalency of objective and subjective measures
was conducted by Chandler and Hanks (1993).Based on a sam-
ple of 120 firms from varied manufacturing industries, the
authors assessed the relevance,availability, reliability, and valid-
ity of performance measures (growth and business volume)
gained by asking respondents to: (1) indicate their perform-
ance in broad categories; (2) complete a weighted satisfaction
with a performance index similar to that introduced by Gupta
and Govindarajan; and (3) indicate, using a Likert-type scale,
their perceived performance relative to competitors (similar to
Dess and Robinson 1984; Sapienza et al. 1988). Their study
found strong positive correlations between self-reported
growth and volume in broad categories and two subjective
measures, performance relative to competitors and the satis-
faction with performance index.Chandler and Hanks conclud-
ed, however, that satisfaction with performance is particularly
suspect as an equivalent performance measure since its rele-
vance is unknown and external validity was found to be inad-
equate. External validity was listed as a concern because inde-
pendent variables previously found to impact new venture
performance had little effect on the satisfaction with perform-
ance measure.
Investigations into the equivalency of subjective measures
in both the organizational behavior and marketing literatures
have produced similar results. In the organizational behavior
literature, Bommer et al. (1995) conducted a meta-analysis
and found a .389 correlation between objective (direct meas-
ures of countable behaviors) and subjective measures (super-
visor ratings of performance). The authors concluded that
while significantly correlated, the measures are not enough
so to be used interchangeably. Likewise, in the marketing lit-
erature, Dawes (1999) found that while objective measures
(ROI and ROA) were strongly correlated with subjective
measures (measured by “Please rate the performance of your
company as . . . 1=terrible to 11=absolutely outstanding”), the
correlation (.48) was far from perfect. Combined, the litera-
ture seems to suggest that while objective and subjective
measures are correlated, they clearly are not the same thing.
Therefore, the current study consistent with Bommer et
al. (1995) and Dawes (1999), takes the position that objective
and subjective performance measures,while positively corre-
lated, should still be considered separate constructs.
H1: Objective and subjective measures of performance
will be positively correlated.
H2: When factor analyzed, objective and subjective
measures of performance will load on separate factors.
Satisfaction with Performance
Studying objective performance measures has the important
advantage of facilitating performance comparisons across
firms.This desire for comparability, combined with the previ-
ously mentioned difficulties in obtaining objective perform-
ance data on entrepreneurial firms, may have contributed to
the search for objective performance equivalents. Of particu-
lar interest to this study, however, is to explain and under-
stand the concept of satisfaction with performance itself.
Although frequently used as a potential surrogate for
objective performance, satisfaction with performance is an
important variable of interest in its own right (Cooper and
Artz 1995).The stakeholder approach to performance meas-
urement contends that organizations are successful to the
extent that important stakeholders’ interests are satisfied.
Arguably the most important stakeholder of an entrepreneur-
ial firm is the company owner. Cooper and Artz (1995: 440)
call entrepreneurial satisfaction1 a “fundamental measure of
success for the individual entrepreneur” and note that it may
impact critical investment and continuance decisions.
Satisfaction has been linked to voluntary job turnover in the
organizational behavior literature (DeConinck and
Bachmann 1994; Griffin and Batemann 1986; Mathieu and
Zajac 1990; Parnell and Crandall 2003; among others).
Although seldom studied in the entrepreneurship literature
(Cooper and Artz 1995), the consequences of satisfaction are
likely much greater for a business owner than for employees
in large organizations.As a result, understanding what drives
this satisfaction is critical.
Therefore, the current study takes the position that factors
other than actual growth and profitability (objective per-
formance) will explain satisfaction with performance.These
factors include perceived environmental hostility, vulnerabil-
ity, perceived competitive advantage, and commitment. The
model is shown in Figure 1.
Environmental Hostility
Satisfaction with performance may vary with the entrepre-
neur’s perceived environmental hostility. Hostile environ-
ments are those that are risky as a result of intense competi-
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tion that is largely, if not entirely, beyond the control of the
firm (McGee and Rubach 1996). Entrepreneurs perceiving a
very hostile environment may be satisfied with lower per-
formance levels, believing that firm performance could be
much worse given the environment. Others may feel that
higher performance levels are needed to compensate the
entrepreneur for the increased risk of operating in a hostile
environment. In either case, satisfaction with performance
would be affected by perceived environmental hostility.
H3: Controlling for objective performance, environ-
mental hostility will explain additional variance in sat-
isfaction with performance.
Vulnerability
While perceived risk is largely a function of perceived
mar0ket characteristics, internal firm factors—such as finan-
cial leverage and liquidity—may greatly affect the entrepre-
neur’s vulnerability to external market characteristics.
Greater debt levels and lower liquidity significantly increase
the likelihood of bankruptcy and financial ruin for the entre-
preneur. Such vulnerability should cause entrepreneurs to
expect greater, compensating performance levels to main-
tain an appropriate risk-reward balance. Entrepreneurs
expecting greater performance levels should be less satisfied
with a given level of performance than entrepreneurs with
lower expectations.
Apart from the increased vulnerability to bankruptcy, high
debt levels and low liquidity place considerable pressure on
firm operations and cash flow. As organizational slack is
reduced, organizational stress is likely increased. Relatively
small mistakes and inefficiencies have the potential to cause
considerable harm to the venture and subsequently to the
entrepreneur when organizational slack is minimal. This
stress, combined with the greater likelihood of bankruptcy,
may significantly impact the entrepreneur’s stated satisfac-
tion with performance.Given such a circumstance, good per-
formance may not be good enough.
H4: Controlling for objective performance, vulnerabil-
ity will explain additional variance in satisfaction with
performance.
Perceived Competitive Advantage
Entrepreneurs may be more satisfied with the performance
of their firms if they believe they enjoy a strong competitive
position in the marketplace. In this study we consider three
perspectives likely to impact perceived competitive advan-
tage: perceived resource advantage, perceived advantage of
generic strategies, and self-assessed competencies.
The resource-based view of the firm argues that firms are
more likely to earn and sustain long-term profitability if they
own or control resources that are valuable, rare, difficult to
imitate, and efficiently used (Barney 1991). Entrepreneurs
who believe that their resource base fits these characteristics
should, as a result, also believe that their long-term potential
in the marketplace is strong; thereby enhancing their satisfac-
tion with performance.
In the entrepreneurship literature, research on new ven-
ture performance has found that generic firm-level strategies
significantly affect firm performance (McDougall 1987;
Sandberg and Hofer 1987). Entrepreneurs believing their
firms enjoy a relative competitive advantage, such as lower
costs, loyal customers, superior product quality, etc., should
also believe that the potential for sustained long-term success
is enhanced, thereby enhancing their satisfaction with per-
formance.
Entrepreneurs who believe they possess personal compe-
tencies shown to enhance the probability of long-term suc-
cess should also believe their likelihood of long-term success
is greater and thereby express greater satisfaction with per-
formance. Chandler and Jansen (1992) found self-assessed
competencies to be significantly related to performance.
Entrepreneurs, for example, who believe that they possess
strong abilities to identify emerging market opportunities, to
efficiently organize business operations, and to gather need-
ed support for the venture should also believe that their long-
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to Affect Satisfaction with Performance
• Objective Performance (H1 & H2)
• (Growth & Profitability)
• Environmental Hostility (H3)
• Vulnerability (H4)
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term potential for success is significant. If nothing else, the
optimism and positive orientation often associated with
higher self-evaluations should also be associated with higher
stated satisfaction with performance.
H5: Controlling for objective performance, perceived
competitive advantage will explain additional variance
in satisfaction with performance.
Commitment
Commitment to the venture may impact satisfaction with
performance. Dyer (1992) noted that entrepreneurs vary
greatly in their level of commitment to their businesses.
Differences in commitment levels may cause entrepreneurs
to require different levels of profitability for entrepreneurs to
be satisfied with the same. Although there are many facets
and measures of commitment, we will examine emotional
commitment, education level, and committed resources as
indicators of commitment in this study.
Entrepreneurs expressing strong emotional ties to a busi-
ness may be more satisfied with a given level of performance.
Emotionally committed entrepreneurs may be less likely to
sell or close their businesses regardless of firm performance.
In the organizational behavior literature, organizational com-
mitment, defined as an individual’s identification with and
involvement in an organization (Steers 1977),has been found
to significantly and negatively affect voluntary job turnover
(Mathieu and Zajac 1990). This persistence, sometimes
referred to as continuance commitment, is a recognized part
of emotional or attitudinal commitment (Mathieu and Zajac
1990). Entrepreneurs with less commitment to a specific
business may focus more on opportunity costs, causing them
to consider more critically the performance of their present
venture(s). Such opportunity costs, however, are likely much
less of a focus for highly committed entrepreneurs as they
invest less time and energy in the identification and assess-
ment of possible alternatives to the existing venture(s).
Another, more direct reason why emotional or affective com-
mitment may impact satisfaction with performance is that
such commitment has been found to be positively correlated
with job performance in the organizational behavior litera-
ture (Riketta 2002). If affective commitment leads to
improved job performance by entrepreneurs, and if that, in
turn, leads to better firm performance, one would expect
affective commitment to affect satisfaction with perform-
ance.
Cooper et al. (1994) predicted and found that education
level contributed to both marginal survival and high growth.
The authors concluded that educational attainment may
“reflect certain qualities of ‘stick-to-it-ness’ through a combi-
nation of commitment, motivation, and discipline” (p. 389).
Since high performance and satisfaction with performance
are likely related, one would predict that education level
should be positively related to satisfaction with performance.
The relationship between education level and satisfaction
with performance is not likely so clear however. As Cooper
et al. (1994: 376) also noted,“It may be that more educated
entrepreneurs perceive a higher opportunity cost in staying
with a marginal business.This could lead to a higher level of
performance in order to stay with a venture…” While the
preponderance of evidence indicates that education level
contributes positively to firm performance, better educated
entrepreneurs may expect better performance and not be as
satisfied with a given level of performance as a result.
Total resources committed to a business may also be an
indication of entrepreneurial commitment. Arguably, entre-
preneurs who commit more resources are likely to be more
committed to their businesses.Cooper et al. (1994) found the
amount of initial financial capital raised to be positively asso-
ciated with the probabilities of marginal survival and growth.
McCarthy (1992) also found initial capital to be positively
related to new venture performance. While the preponder-
ance of the literature has shown a positive relationship
between initial capital and performance (Cooper et al.1994),
the relationship between committed resources and satisfac-
tion with performance may be analogous to the relationship
between education level and satisfaction with performance.
Having committed more resources, an entrepreneur would
require greater profits to earn the same rate of return on his
or her investment. As a result, entrepreneurs who commit
more resources may be less satisfied with the same level of
profitability than entrepreneurs who commit fewer
resources.
H6: Controlling for objective performance, commit-




Data were gathered from a sample of new and/or small
manufacturing businesses located in Harris County, Texas.
The industries selected were: SIC code 27, printing and allied
industries; SIC code 28, chemicals and allied products; SIC
code 30, rubber and plastic manufactured products; SIC code
34, metal fabricating; SIC code 35, machinery manufacturing;
SIC code 36, electrical and electronic products manufactur-
ing; and SIC code 38, measuring, analyzing, and controlling
instruments. Sampling only manufacturing firms reduced
interindustry effects.All of the firms were listed in the Dun
& Bradstreet Regional Directory-Houston, the Directory of
Texas Manufacturers, or the State of Texas Sales Tax Files.
Firms were eligible for sample inclusion if (1) they were
located in Harris County, (2) they were privately and inde-
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pendently owned, and (3) they were less than five years old,
or they had fewer than 500 employees. Approximately an
equal number of firms from each industry group were select-
ed from each of the three sample sources.
Data Gathering
The Dillman (1978) approach to survey design and mail-out
procedures was used as a guide in this study.Two full mail-
outs and a post card reminder were conducted. Of the 1,889
firms that were mailed a survey, 109 were returned as unde-
liverable and could not be contacted by telephone, 34 of the
businesses indicated an established policy of not participat-
ing in studies, 23 of the businesses were found to be actually
located outside Harris County, 16 of the businesses were no
longer in operation,10 businesses were discovered to be sub-
sidiaries of larger corporations, and 1 firm failed to meet the
preestablished criterion of having less than 500 employees
or being less than five years old.Of the 1,696 firms eligible to
respond, usable responses were returned by 368 of the busi-
nesses, yielding a 21.7 percent response rate.
Tests for Possible Response Bias
Two tests for possible response bias were conducted. First,
using only the data provided in the sample source (i.e., Dun
& Bradstreet, Directory of Texas Manufacturing, and the
Texas State Sales Tax Files), tests for significant mean differ-
ences on key characteristic variables between responding
and nonresponding firms were conducted. The only signifi-
cant differences found revealed that respondents from the
Dun & Bradstreet sample had less employees and lower
sales levels than nonrespondents from the same source and
that respondents from the Directory of Texas
Manufacturing sample had less employees than nonrespon-
dents from the same source.The differences suggest that care
should be taken when generalizing from the results of this
study to firms in the Dun & Bradstreet and Directory of
Texas Manufacturers directories in general.
The second test compared the responses provided on the
survey to the same data published by the three sample
sources.To do this, the difference between the value in the
published source and the value in the survey was calculated
for each observation in the sample.The only found significant
difference was that the Sales Tax Files listed firms as being an
average of 5.42 years younger than reported by the owners
on the survey. Date of first sale was used to mark the age of
the business in the survey while the Sales Tax Files provide
data on the date of sales tax number issue.The difference in
firm age may result from the fact that some firms are issued
new sales tax numbers after experiencing an event such as a
change in the name of the business or a change in owner-
ship. Busenitz and Murphy (1996) found that the Sales Tax
Files accurately reported the age of the business 71.7 percent
of the time. It is possible, therefore, that the remaining 28.3
percent is capable of biasing the reported age of the busi-
ness.Also, Busenitz and Murphy (1996) considered a recent-
ly purchased business as being new while this study consid-
ered the date of the original sale independent of changes in
ownership. The result of this second test suggests that
respondents have been consistent and accurate in reporting
data about their firms.
Construct Exploration—Measures
Satisfaction with Performance. Data were gathered to
measure respondent’s stated satisfaction with growth and sat-
isfaction with profitability. Respondents were asked to indi-
cate on a five-point Likert scale their satisfaction with the
growth of the business. A parallel question asked respondents
to indicate their satisfaction with the profitability of the busi-
ness. This approach parallels Cooper and Artz (1995) who
asked respondents to assess their satisfaction with their ven-
ture’s sales and profits.
Objective Performance. Four measures of firm growth
were used: (1) absolute change in employees over the pre-
ceding two years, (2) percentage change in employees over
the same time period, (3) absolute change in sales, and (4)
percentage change in sales over the same time period were
used. Respondents were asked in the survey to provide infor-
mation on total full-time equivalent employees and revenues
for the corresponding years.
Five measures of profitability were used in the study: (1)
return on assets, (2) return on equity, (3) return on sales, (4)
net income, and (5) owner’s draw.The survey asked respon-
dents to provide information on components required to
calculate return on assets, equity, and sales. Net income was
one of those components. Owner’s draw was measured in
categories. Respondents were asked to indicate their total
compensation from the business in the previous year. Eight
categories were provided ranging from less than $10,000 to
more than $1 million. All of the growth and profitability
measures used in this study have been used by prior
researchers studying entrepreneurial performance (Murphy
et al. 1996).
Environmental Hostility. Two variables were used to
measure perceived environmental hostility: (1) perceived fre-
quency of price wars and (2) perceived intensity of price
wars. Survey respondents were asked to assess the level of
competitiveness in their industry, using a five-point Likert
scale, on the frequency of price wars and the intensity of
price wars. Strong price competition is a classic measure of
competitiveness in an industry (Porter 1980).The correlation
between price war frequency and price war intensity was
.91 (coefficient alpha was .97). Frequency of price wars and
intensity of price wars were combined and averaged to form
a composite measure of environmental hostility.
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Vulnerability.Three measures of vulnerability were used
in the study. Debt to assets and debt to equity were measured
as the firm’s total debt to total assets and total debt to total
equity respectively.The third measure was firm liquidity.The
current ratio (current assets divided by total current liabili-
ties) was used to measure liquidity. Data for these measures
were gained by asking respondents to provide basic balance
sheet financial information. Firms high in debt to assets and
equity and low in liquidity are more vulnerable to bankrupt-
cy. The three measures were normalized, combined and aver-
aged to form a single measure of vulnerability. The coefficient
alpha for the three-item scale was .87.
Perceived Competitive Advantage. Resource advan-
tage was operationalized as the extent that firms possess
resources that are valuable, rare or unique, difficult or costly
to imitate, and efficiently used (Barney 1991). Respondents
were asked to identify from a list the two resources that are
most important for their business.Two spaces were provided
for respondents to identify resources not on the list. Four
subsequent questions asked respondents to rate the previ-
ously identified resources as to their value, uniqueness, diffi-
culty or ease to imitate, and efficiency of use, through the use
of Likert-type scales. The ratings of the identified resources
were then combined to form a single measure of resource
advantage (coefficient alpha was .73).
Generic business level strategic advantage was measured
using five items. Respondents were asked to assess, com-
pared to their competitors, the extent that their business
charges a low price, emphasizes product quality, offers a full
range of products,emphasizes customer service,and has a lot
of customer loyalty.
Perceived competencies of the entrepreneur were meas-
ured by using items from the scale developed by Chandler
and Jansen (1992). In particular, items were taken to measure
the entrepreneurial, political or resource acquisition, and
managerial competencies of the respondents. The scales
developed by Chandler and Jansen have been empirically
shown to have adequate reliability (Chandler and Jansen
1992) as judged by the standards established by Nunnally
(1978). For this study, the subscales were found to have coef-
ficient alphas of between .75 and .76.
To make the study more parsimonious, an attempt was
made to further reduce the perceived competitive advantage
data. Specifically, factor analysis using varimax rotation found
three strong factors.The first factor included customer serv-
ice, product quality, and customer loyalty (loadings between
.78 and .89) and was retained and labeled differentiation.The
second strong factor included the three self-assessed compe-
tency variables (loadings between .67 and .80) and was
retained and labeled competencies. Only the variable low
price loaded strongly on the third factor (.97) and was
retained and labeled the same (low price). Resource advan-
tage was retained as a separate variable since it did not load
well on any of the factors.
Commitment. Four measures of commitment were used
in this study. Six items from Porter and Smith’s (1970)
Organizational Commitment Questionnaire were modified to
reflect an entrepreneur’s organizational commitment to a spe-
cific business as a measure of emotional commitment. The
coefficient alpha for the scale was found to be .75. Education
level was measured as the highest degree earned. Initial size
of the firm and total investment in the firm were used as
measures of total resources committed. Initial size was meas-
ured as the number of employees and sales level one year
after the firm made its initial sale. Respondents were asked to
provide this information on the questionnaire. Initial (or very
early) employees and initial sales were standardized and then
combined to form a measure of initial size (correlation was
.57, coefficient alpha was .73). Total investment in the firm
was measured by asking respondents to indicate how much
money they and others had invested in the business, exclud-
ing reinvested profits. An attempt was made to further reduce
the commitment variables, however, none of the variables
loaded well together and the four commitment measures
were unchanged as a result.
Methodology and Results
First, simple zero-order (Pearson’s) correlations were calcu-
lated. The correlations between the objective measures of
growth and profitability and the subjective measures of per-
formance (satisfaction with growth and satisfaction with
profits) are presented in Table 1. Overall, the positive correla-
tions between the objective and subjective measures of per-
formance show that H1 is largely supported. All of the objec-
tive measures except return on equity were found to be sig-
nificantly positively related to satisfaction with profitability.
Interestingly, all four of the objective growth measures were
found to be significantly related to satisfaction with profits.
The same four growth measures were found to be significant-
ly positively related to satisfaction with growth. Net income
and owner’s draw were also found to be significantly posi-
tively related to satisfaction with growth. The three return
measures of profitability return on sales, return on assets,and
return on equity, however, were not significantly related to
satisfaction with growth.
Next, these eleven variables were then factor analyzed to
see how they loaded onto the constructs.This factor analysis
is presented in Table 2. The results show that the variables
loaded onto four constructs (growth, profit efficiency, raw
profits, and satisfaction with performance), and that all the
variables, except absolute growth in sales, loaded specifically
onto one construct. Overall, the first three constructs related
to objective performance while the fourth construct related
to subjective performance.
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As indicated, percentage and absolute growth in employ-
ees and percentage growth in sales loaded onto the growth
construct, explaining 27 percent of the total variance.
Return on sales, assets, and equity loaded onto a single con-
struct that we term profit efficiency, explaining more than
19 percent of the variance. Net income and owner’s draw
loaded onto the construct raw profits, explaining greater
than 13 percent of the variance, while absolute growth in
sales loaded about equally onto growth and raw profits.
Finally, satisfaction with profitability and growth loaded onto
a separate construct, satisfaction with performance, explain-
ing more than 10 percent of the variance. Clearly, H2 is sup-
ported, with all but one measure of performance loading
onto separate factors and satisfaction with performance
measures loading separately.
The growth, profit efficiency and raw profits factors were
retained and used throughout the remainder of the study.
Satisfaction with growth and satisfaction with profitability were
combined and averaged to form the composite measure, satisfac-
tion with performance. The correlation between the two
measures was .50 and the coefficient alpha for the two-item
scale was .67.
Next, hierarchical linear regression
was used to test hypotheses 3 through 6.
Specifically, F tests for significant
changes in R-squared were used to test
the hypotheses.The results of the analy-
sis are presented in Table 3.
Equation 1 assessed the extent that the
objective measures of performance affect-
ed satisfaction with performance and
established the baseline for testing the
remaining hypotheses.Equation 1 was sig-
nificant at the .01 level of statistical signif-
icance, providing further, partial support
for hypothesis 1. Growth and raw profits
were found to be significantly related to
satisfaction with performance. Profit effi-
ciency, however, was not significantly
related to satisfaction with performance.
Interestingly, the objective measures
explained only 13 percent of the variance
in satisfaction with performance.
Equation 2 then tested hypothesis 3,
that perceived environmental hostility,
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Absolute Growth in Sales
2. Percentage Growth in Sales **.50
3. Absolute Growth in Employees **.38 **.41
4. Percentage Growth in Employees **.34 **.53 **.68
5. Net Income **.48 **.16 **.21 .09
6. Return on Sales -.10 .07 .01 .04 **.29
7. Return on Assets -.05 .02 -.09 -.01 **.31 **.72
8. Return on Equity -.04 -.05 -.06 -.09 .08 **.33 **.37
9. Owner’s Draw **.38 .06 **.19 *.13 **.55 **-.16 -.09 -.08
10. Satisfaction with Growth **.29 **.24 **.28 **.32 **.15 .03 .05 -.04 **.24
11. Satisfaction with Profitability **.19 **.19 **.19 **.17 **.22 *.11 *.14 -.03 **.33 **.50
* p<.05 ** p<.01
Table 1. Correlations Between Measures of Growth, Measures of Profitability, 
Satisfaction with Growth, and Satisfaction with Profitability




Growth Efficiency Profits Performance
Percentage Growth in Employees .85 -.02 -.03 .17
Absolute Growth in Employees .81 -.06 .11 .04
Percentage Growth in Sales .76 .05 .11 .11
Return on Assets -.04 .88 .05 .11
Return on Sales .05 .88 -.03 .08
Return on Equity -.05 .61 .04 .11
Net Income .10 .32 .85 .05
Owner’s Draw -.02 -.19 .81 .26
Absolute Growth in Sales .51 -.08 .59 .02
Satisfaction with Profitability .02 .06 .18 .87
Satisfaction with Growth .27 -.02 .07 .80
Eigenvalue 2.97 2.12 1.45 1.15
Percentage of Variance Explained 27.02% 19.27% 13.35% 10.43%
Table 2. Factor Analysis of Measures of Growth, 
Measures of Profitability, Satisfaction with Growth, 
and Satisfaction with Profitability
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controlling for objective performance, would predict addi-
tional variance in satisfaction with performance.The adjusted
R-square was .14 and the change in R-square was statistically
significant at .05, providing support for hypothesis 3. The
results of this study indicate that environmental hostility is
negatively related to satisfaction with performance, when
controlling for objective performance.
Next, equation 3 tested whether, controlling for objective
performance, vulnerability would explain additional variance
in satisfaction with performance.Vulnerability was found to
be strongly negatively related to satisfaction with perform-
ance.The change in R-square was significant at .001 and the
adjusted R-square was found to be .15.Therefore, hypothesis
4 receives strong support.
Equation 4 tested whether perceived competitive advan-
tage would explain additional variance in satisfaction with
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Variables Equation Equation Equation Equation Equation 
1 2 3 4 5
Stage 1
Objective Performance
Growth Factor ***.25 ***.25 ***.25 ***.25 ***.25
Profit Efficiency Factor .05 .05 .05 .05 .05












Initial Size of the Firm *-.10
Total Investment in Firm *-.12
F ***19.30
Adjusted R2 .13 .14 .15 .24 .27
Significant Change in R-Square (F) *5.37 ***11.03 ***17.78 ***20.52
* p<.05   ** p<.01   *** p<.001
Equation 1 (H1):  SP = ß0 + ß1(Objective Performance) + error 
Equation 2 (H3):  SP = ß0 + ß1(Objective Performance) + ß2(Environmental Hostility) + error
Equation 3 (H4):  SP = ß0 + ß1(Objective Performance) + ß3(Vulnerability) + error
Equation 4 (H5):  SP = ß0 + ß1(Objective Performance) + ß4(Perceived Competitive Advantage) + error
Equation 5 (H6):  SP = ß0 + ß1(Objective Performance) + ß5(Commitment) + error
SP = Satisfaction with Performance
Table 3. Hypotheses Tests Using Two-Stage Hierarchical Regression
Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with Performance
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performance, controlling for objective performance.Table 3
shows that the change in R-square was significant at .001,
providing support for hypothesis 5. Combined, these vari-
ables nearly doubled the percentage of variance explained in
satisfaction with performance (adjusted R-square of .24).
Competencies, resources, differentiation, and low price were
all found to be significantly positively related to satisfaction
with performance.
Equation 5 tested whether controlling for growth, if com-
mitment (measured by commitment,education, initial size of
the firm, and total investment in firm) would explain addi-
tional variance in satisfaction with performance. Table 3
shows that the change in R-square was very significant
(F=20.52), offering strong support for hypothesis 6. For this
equation, the adjusted R-square was more than double that
of the model considering only objective measures of per-
formance. Emotional commitment, education level, initial
size of the firm, and total investment were all found to
explain additional variance in satisfaction with perform-
ance. Of the four significant relationships, only emotional
commitment was positively related to satisfaction with per-
formance.
Although not a hypothesis test, it is interesting to note that
when the objective performance,environmental hostility,vul-
nerability, perceived competitive advantage, and commit-
ment variables are entered into an equation together, they
explain more than 34 percent (adjusted R-square) of the vari-
ance in satisfaction with performance.This stands in contrast
to the 13 percent of variance in satisfaction explained by
objective measures of growth and profitability. Clearly, satis-
faction with performance is affected by much more than
objective performance measures.
Discussion
Ultimately, the results of this study reaffirm the conclusions
of Bommer et al. (1995) and Dawes (1999) that objective and
subjective performance measures are positively correlated,
yet should still be considered separate constructs.The corre-
lation analysis shows many significant positive correlations
between the subjective measures satisfaction with growth
and profitability with the objective measures of perform-
ance. The factor analysis, though, shows that these eleven
variables loaded separately onto our constructs: growth,prof-
it efficiency, raw profits, and satisfaction with performance.
As such, it is important to note that the various objective and
subjective measures of performance should not be consid-
ered interchangeably.
Next, this study proposed and tested a model of factors
predicted to affect satisfaction with performance. Variables
pertaining to environmental hostility, vulnerability, perceived
competitive advantage, and commitment were shown to
explain additional variance in satisfaction with performance,
after controlling for actual performance (growth and prof-
itability).Therefore, consistent with Cooper and Artz (1995),
this study confirms the notion that satisfaction with perform-
ance seems to be an important variable of interest in its own
right. Satisfaction with performance derives from more than
actual profitability and growth.
Clearly, the satisfaction of entrepreneurial owners is a
much more complicated process than simply being the result
of actual profitability and growth. Given the importance of
owners as key stakeholders,and the resulting impact on com-
mitment that is so important for future growth and profitabil-
ity (Cooper and Artz 1995), satisfaction is clearly of critical
importance for the study of entrepreneurship and perform-
ance. As such, this study has established the importance of
satisfaction, as well as its being a deep and subjective con-
cept. For these reasons, studies such as this about entrepre-
neurs’ satisfaction provide a worthy research topic.
However, care must be taken in drawing conclusions or
generalizing from the results of this study. First, the study
applies to manufacturing industries and to small and young
firms.As such, the results may not be generalizable to other
industries or more established firms.
Second, while this study addresses variables explaining
additional variance in satisfaction, it is quite likely that satis-
faction with performance, will in turn, affect other variables,
particularly commitment.The organizational behavior litera-
ture includes numerous studies that consider both organiza-
tional commitment and job satisfaction (DeConinck and
Bachmann 1994; Parnell and Crandall 2003), with each vari-
able repeatedly used as a predictor of the other.Nevertheless,
substantial literature has focused on job satisfaction because
it is considered such a critical outcome variable in organiza-
tions (Griffin and Bateman 1986; Parnell and Crandall 2003),
with organizational commitment predicting job satisfaction.
Similarly, this study considers satisfaction as an outcome of
entrepreneurial commitment. Our approach is also consis-
tent with Cooper et al. (1994), who viewed educational and
capital commitment as predictor variables.
However, Cooper and Artz (1995) did argue that satisfac-
tion may impact investment and continuance decisions.
Therefore, future studies may need to consider the corre-
sponding effect of satisfaction on commitment, as well as
other variables. Perhaps future research should take a longi-
tudinal approach to measuring the mutually reinforcing
effect of satisfaction and objective measures of performance.
For example, an increase in satisfaction in the short term,
resulting from perhaps perceptions of competitive advantage
or risk,may then lead to increased commitment over the long
term, also resulting in increased satisfaction, and so on.The
current study and the model proposed here is just the begin-
ning. Much more research on entrepreneur’s satisfaction and
performance needs to be done.
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Endnote
1Cooper and Artz (1995) measured entrepreneurial satisfaction with four items: satisfaction with venture sales, satisfaction with
venture profits, overall satisfaction with the business, and willingness to start the same business again.
References
Barney, J. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of Management 17: 99–120.
Bommer,W.H., J.L. Johnson, G.A. Rich, P.M. Podsakoff, and S.B. MacKenzie. 1995. On the interchangeability of objective and sub-
jective measures of employee performance:A meta-analysis. Personnel Psychology 48: 587–606.
Busenitz, L., and G.B.Murphy,G.B.1996.New evidence in the pursuit of locating new businesses. Journal of Business Venturing
11: 221–231.
Chandler,G.N., and S.H.Hanks.1993.Measuring the performance of emerging businesses:A validation study. Journal of Business
Venturing 8: 391–408.
Chandler, G.N., and E. Jansen. 1992. The founder’s self-assessed competence and venture performance. Journal of Business
Venturing 7: 223–236.
Cooper, A.C. 1993. Challenges in predicting new firm performance. Journal of Business Venturing 8: 241–253.
Cooper, A.C., and K.W.Artz. 1995. Determinants of satisfaction for entrepreneurs. Journal of Business Venturing 10: 439–457.
Cooper, A.C., F.J. Gimeno-Gascon, and C.Y.Woo. 1994. Initial human and financial capital as predictors of new venture perform-
ance. Journal of Business Venturing 9: 371–395.
Covin, J.G., and T.J. Covin. 1990. Competitive aggressiveness, environmental context, and small firm performance.
Entrepreneurship, Theory and Practice 14: 35–50.
Covin, J.G., and D.P. Slevin. 1990. New venture strategic posture, structure, and performance: An industry life cycle analysis.
Journal of Business Venturing 5: 123–135.
Covin, J.G., D.P. Slevin, and T.J. Covin. 1990. Content and performance of growth-seeking strategies:A comparison of small firms
in high and low technology industries. Journal of Business Venturing 5: 391–412.
Dawes, J. 1999. The relationship between subjective and objective company performance measures in market orientation
research: Further empirical evidence. Marketing Bulletin 10: 65–75.
DeConinck, J.B., and D.P. Bachmann. 1994. Organizational commitment and turnover implications of marketing managers.
Journal of Applied Business Research 10: 87–95.
Deeds, D.L., D. DeCarolis, and J.E. Coombs, J.E. 1998. Firm specific resources and wealth creation in high-technology ventures:
Evidence from newly public biotechnology firms. Entrepreneurship, Theory & Practice 22: 55–73.
Dess, G.G., and R.B. Robinson, Jr. 1984. Measuring organizational performance in the absence of objective measures. Strategic
Management Journal 5: 274–286.
Dillman, D.A. 1978. Mail and telephone surveys:The total design method. New York:Wiley-Interscience.
Dillman, D.A., M.D. Sinclair, and J.R. Clark. 1993. Effects of questionnaire length, respondent-friendly design, and a difficult ques-
tion on response rates for occupant-addressed census mail surveys. Public Opinion Quarterly 57: 289–304.
Dyer,W.G. 1992. The entrepreneurial experience. San Francisco: Josey-Bass.
Geringer, J.M., and L. Hebert. 1991. Measuring performance of international joint ventures. Journal of International Business
Studies 22: 249–263.
Glaister, K.W., and P.J. Buckley. 1998. Measures of performance in UK international alliances. Organization Studies 19: 89–118.
24 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
24
New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Vol. 7 [2004], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje/vol7/iss2/1
VARIANCE IN ENTREPRENEURS’ STATED SATISFACTION WITH PERFORMANCE 25
Griffin, R.W., and R.S. Bateman. 1986. Job satisfaction and organizational commitment. In C.L. Cooper and I. Robertson, eds.,
International review of industrial and organization psychology. New York:Wiley.
Gupta,A.K., and V. Govindarajan. 1984. Business unit strategy, managerial characteristics, and business unit effectiveness at strat-
egy implementation. Academy of Management Journal 27: 25–41.
Kanter, R.M., and D. Brinkerhoff. 1981. Organizational performance: Recent developments in measurement. Annual Review of
Sociology 7: 321–349.
Kirchoff, B., and B. Phillips. 1988. The effect of firm formation and growth on job creation in the United States. Journal of
Business Venturing 3: 261–272.
Mathieu, J.E. , and D.M. Zajac. 1990.A review and meta-analysis of the antecedents, correlates, and consequences of organization-
al commitment. Psychological Bulletin 108: 171–194.
McCarthy, A.M. 1992. The role of strategy, environment, resources, and strategic change in new venture performance.
Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Purdue University.
McDougall, P.P. 1987. An analysis of strategy, entry barriers, and origin as factors explaining new venture performance.
Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of South Carolina.
McGee, J.E., and M.J. Rubach. 1996. Responding to increased environmental hostility: A study of the competitive behavior of
small retailers. Journal of Applied Business Research 13: 83–94.
Murphy, G.B., J.W. Trailer, and R.C. Hill. 1996. Measuring performance in entrepreneurship research. Journal of Business
Research 36: 15–23.
Naman, D.P., and D.P. Slevin. 1993. Entrepreneurship and the concept of fit:A model and empirical tests. Strategic Management
Journal 13: 137–153.
Nunnally, J.C. 1978. Psychometric theory. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Parnell, J.A., and R. Crandall. 2003. Propensity for participative decision-making, job satisfaction, organizational commitment,
organizational citizenship behavior, and intentions to leave among Egyptian managers. Multinational 
Business Review 11: 45.
Porter, M.E. 1980. Competitive strategy:Techniques for analyzing industries and competitors. New York: Free Press.
Porter, L.W., and F.J. Smith. (1970). The etiology of organizational commitment. Unpublished paper, University of 
California at Irvine.
Riketta, M. 2002. Attitudinal organizational commitment and job performance: A meta-analysis. Journal of Organizational
Behavior 23: 257–266.
Sandberg,W.R., and C.W.Hofer.1987. Improving new venture performance:The role of strategy, industry structure, and the entre-
preneur. Journal of Business Venturing 2: 5–28.
Sapienza, H.J., K.G. Smith, and M.J. Gannon. 1988. Using subjective evaluations of organizational performance in small business
research. American Journal of Small Business 12: 45–53.
Steers, R.M. 1977. Organizational effectiveness:A behavioral view. Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear.
25
et al.: New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Fall 2004
Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2004
26 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
About the Authors
GREGORY B. MURPHY (gbmurphy@usi.edu) is an assistant professor of management at the University of
Southern Indiana. He received his Ph.D. in business administration from the University of Houston. His
research interests are in the areas of entrepreneurship and electronic commerce. He has previously published
in the Journal of Business Venturing, Journal of Business Research, Journal of High Technology
Management Research, Journal of Business Economics Research, and New England Journal of
Entrepreneurship.
STEPHEN K. CALLAWAY (scallaway@usi.edu) is an assistant professor at the University of Southern Indiana
in Evansville, Indiana. He received his Ph.D. in business administration from Temple University in May 2003.
He teaches courses in strategic management and international business. His research interests include inter-
national entrepreneurship and management of technology. He has published in the New England Journal of
Entrepreneurship, and has presented papers at various conferences, including winning the Best Graduate
Student Paper award at the Midwest Academy of Management meeting in Toledo, Ohio, in 2001.
26
New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Vol. 7 [2004], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje/vol7/iss2/1
The business plan is commonly used as a factor for evaluat-
ing the relationship between firm planning and firm perform-
ance in small firms. Among the current models of entrepre-
neurship, many researchers have asserted a positive relation-
ship between the use of formal planning and firm perform-
ance (see, e.g., Rue and Ibrahim 1998; Perry 2001; Fletcher
and Harris 2002).Typically these models emphasize the use
of written business plans (Rue and Ibrahim 1998; Sahlman
1997). However, the literature has not empirically demon-
strated the expected relationship between formal planning
(resulting in a written business plan) and firm performance
in a consistent manner. In this article, we demonstrate the
theoretical limitations of using business plans as a means of
operationalizing formal planning in empirical research.
Scholars frequently fail to properly account for multiple out-
comes of the firm planning process, introducing omitted vari-
able bias into their research.
We concur that a link probably exists between the use of
written business plans by entrepreneurial firms and their sub-
sequent performance (See e.g.,Perry 2001;Fletcher and Harris
2002;Singhvi 2000;and Rue and Ibrahim 1998).We believe the
tenuous nature of the empirical relationship may be explained
from the perspective of both the content and the composition
of the business plan (Trailer and Wolford 2001).The shortcom-
ing from an empirical research perspective is the assumption
that a written business plan represents good planning.That is,
that the existence of a written business plan means that the
principals in the entrepreneurial firm actually have engaged in
planning, have produced a well-written and convincing busi-
ness plan, have actually executed the plan, and that the per-
ceived business opportunity was a tenable one.
In the next section,we review the literature. In the follow-
ing section, we propose a model showing the situations that
may be encountered when scholars operationalize planning
through the use of business plans.We conclude by discussing
the significance of this study for future empirical research.
Literature Review
Considerable research has evaluated the relationship
between planning and firm performance, albeit usually in
large organizations. However, more recent research has
extended to small, entrepreneurial firms. Unfortunately, the
small business findings are mixed. No clear picture of the
relationship between formal planning and firm performance
has emerged as various authors present conflicting findings.
Some studies found a positive relationship (Perry 2001),
while other studies have found a negative relationship
(Hand,Sineath,and Howle 1987).Therefore, the impact of for-
mal planning on performance is unclear.
Olson and Gough (2001) remark that problems begin with
the different ways in which “formal planning” is defined.
Further problems arise in the methods by which researchers
operationalize formal planning.The most common method is
to assess whether planning leads to a written document.Yet
a written business plan may not be all that it appears to be.
Sahlman argues that “the more elaborately crafted the docu-
ment, the more likely the venture is to, well, flop, for lack of
a more euphemistic word” (Sahlman 1997, p. 98).
The literature offers several explanations for the mixed
results: differing definitions (Perry 2001), different means of
operationalizing the construct (Olson and Gough 2001), and
even questions over the extent to which business plans are
actually produced by small businesses have been discussed
(Parks, Olson, and Bokor, 1991). Sahlman (1997) suggests that
entrepreneurs may be guilty of losing a theoretical perspec-
tive because their written plans reveal they do not have a busi-
ness model that shows genuine insight into their perceived
business opportunity. Hence, it is suspect whether many busi-
ness plans have the proper perspective on what drives a par-
Omitted Variable Bias in the Link 




T his article argues that existing research poorly spec-ifies the link between planning and performancebecause of omitted variable bias. Researchers agree
planning is a critical part of creating any new venture.
Many researchers assess planning by whether a small firm
has a written business plan. Unfortunately, efforts empiri-
cally to validate this relationship have been inconclusive.
This article proposes that researchers should assess busi-
ness plans both on the quality of the plan (and the plan-
ning process that produced it), and on the quality of the
underlying business opportunity. Failure to account for
both aspects of a business plan amounts to omitted vari-
able bias, frustrating attempts to accurately estimate the
true relationship.
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ticular venture.Thus,we would not expect the written plan to
be a good predictor of firm performance if it does not reveal
insight into the business concept.The issue is further compli-
cated because, as Pearce, Freeman, and Robinson (1987)
remark,past studies do not appropriately control for other rel-
evant variables such as leadership or competition.
Another common theme in the literature is the distinc-
tion between the business plan document created to direct
an entrepreneurial/small business versus the process of
planning. Many researchers are alarmed that too much
emphasis is being placed on the business plan rather than
the process that creates the plan (see, e.g., Robinson 1982;
Hills 1985; Parks, Olson, and Bokor 1991; Trailer and Wolford
2001). Hills (1985) was among the first to question the sig-
nificance of a written document. He asked venture capital-
ists to provide their expert assessment of the extent to
which the business plans involved in-depth market informa-
tion.Venture capitalists in his study believed that entrepre-
neurs ignore negative information. Thus, serious questions
are raised about whether a business plan is truly representa-
tive of an adequate planning process. Other researchers
concur, questioning whether written business plans actual-
ly represent good planning because of a variety of potential
problems associated with either the opportunity expressed
in the plan (Sahlman 1997) or the composition of the argu-
ments (Trailer and Wolford 2001). Hall and Mestler point
out, “If your business concept is untenable, no amount of
assistance from business plan software will make it fly”(Hall
and Mestler 1997, p.45).The implication is that knowing the
elements of a business plan and producing a document are
not enough.
Trailer and Wolford (2001) note that the literature has not
emphasized actually writing a business plan despite the
research identifying the steps, the elements, and factors criti-
cal to the written document.They argue that “[m]erely listing
the important topics in a business plan creates only general-
ities. Details must support the arguments made about and for
the topics… That is, effective business plans are the outcome
not only of covering all the bases, but also of covering them
well” (Trailer and Wolford 2001, p. 41).They go on to argue
that entrepreneurs may have great difficulty composing
meaningful business plans because of the intricacies of writ-
ing sound, complex arguments.
Ironically, despite these concerns, much of the empirical
literature continues to emphasize a counting procedure
whereby firms are categorized by whether they have a writ-
ten plan (Olson and Gough 2001).Very little of the research
makes an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of the written
document in a substantive way, assuming that the presence
of a business plans indicates the firm has actually engaged in
planning.1
An “Omitted Variable Bias” Schematic
We have developed a schematic model expressing firms’
potential outcomes expected upon analysis of the concept
and composition of business plans. Although our model
will be of limited use to practitioners, we hope the model
proves useful to researchers in understanding the empirical
difficulties linking business plans and firm performance.We
suggest that business plans may be evaluated on at least two
dimensions. Empirical failure to account for both dimen-
sions amounts to omitted variable bias in one’s estimates
of the relationship between business plans and business
performance. In the first of the two dimensions, the busi-
ness concept may either be tenable or not tenable (i.e., the
idea may have genuine commercial potential or it may not
have commercial potential). Second, the plan may be either
well written or poorly written. A well-written plan will be
persuasive, consisting of a number of complex arguments
that “produce strong conclusions regarding the feasibility of
starting a business” (Trailer and Wolford 2001, p. 41). Our
two dimensions led to a 2x2 model depicting four out-
comes. Each cell in the model is associated with a different
outcome (see Figure 1).
In the lower left-hand quadrant is a company with a writ-
ten business plan in which the concept is untenable and the
document has poor composition. This situation is clearly
associated with negative firm performance. Yet, if
researchers use written business plans as a measure of for-
mal planning, this firm would be categorized with firms pos-
sessing well-written business plans supporting tenable (or
even untenable) business concepts. Such data confusion is
an example of omitted variable bias and will lead to ineffi-
cient empirical estimates.
The upper left-hand quadrant represents a poorly written
business plan based on a tenable concept.The problem with
this type of document is that it may not be able to engage
the people in the firm (Carland and Carland 2003).As such,
the document is not persuasive and does not capture the
support of the firm’s employees. Because the underlying
business concept is good, the firm may succeed, but it will
do so despite its business plan, rather than because of its
business plan.
The lower right-hand quadrant is a firm that has written a
convincing business plan for a concept that is simply unten-
able, a frequent occurrence according to Sahlman (1997).
The entrepreneurs convince themselves that their idea will
work and may even be able to put together a flashy docu-
ment to support their concept. However, a persuasive docu-
ment is no substitute for a plan to economically produce a
good or service a customer base actually wants. Empirically,
firms in this cell would produce a negative relationship
between planning and performance.
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In the upper right-hand quadrant of the model is a firm
possessing a tenable business concept as documented in a
well-composed business plan. This situation is what most
researchers implicitly envision when they analyze the rela-
tionship between formal planning and firm performance.
Such firms would produce an empirically significant,
positive relationship between planning and performance.
Unfortunately, this is an ideal situation for which there may
not be many real-world examples.
Business plans are regularly evolving documents, so there
can be some confusion as to what it means to “evaluate a busi-
ness plan.” However, for a plan to be effective it cannot change
too rapidly or radically, or it loses its impact as a strategic doc-
ument. Certainly, though, the literature evaluates plans and
planning despite recognizing the ongoing process nature of
both. Metaphorically, we can view evaluating a business plan 
as analyzing the occasional frame in a motion picture. Our
schematic model is designed to demonstrate to scholars the
potential source of omitted variable bias which has frustrated
their empirical research. It will be of limited use, at best, for
practitioners or consultants seeking to apply ex ante process
control or ex post process analysis to a firm’s planning.
This study has an important implication for
future empirical research. The existing litera-
ture cannot seem to conclusively agree on the
relationship between formal planning and firm
performance. Our research suggests that we
are placing far too much emphasis on the exis-
tence of a written plan, rather than on the con-
tent of the plan, whether planning was accom-
plished to write the plan, or the viability of the
perceived business opportunity. The presump-
tion that the mere presence of a business plan
will lead to positive firm performance assumes
that the business plan represents a good idea
and that the plan has been well written. Our
model suggests that at least three other out-
comes are possible; it is these other outcomes
that provide an explanation for the mixed
results of empirical research. Firms with poorly
written business plans and business plans
based on untenable concepts—conditions
expected to lead to poor firm outcomes—are
empirically classified as having engaged in
effective planning. Scholars should recognize
that a richer means of assessing the relation-
ship between planning and performance is
needed, given the problems with traditional
planning-performance research.
Unfortunately, discovering the existence of
omitted variable bias is far easier than rectifying
the problem.We believe we have identified the root problem
that frustrates empirical researchers, but we have not solved
it. Neither can a practitioner take our 2x2 schematic and pro-
duce a “can’t fail” business plan nor assess the quality of her
planning process.Our schematic indicates the need for empir-
ical methods able to separate the quality of a business plan’s
arguments from the quality of the underlying business oppor-
tunity, ex ante.Therein lies the principal difficulty, as the most
effective way of testing the quality of a perceived business
opportunity is to observe the profitability of a firm organized
to meet that perceived opportunity. Clearly, many market
opportunities envisioned by entrepreneurs are, in reality, little
more than wishful thinking.Yet the market is rife with exam-
ples of “bad ideas” that have become extraordinarily success-
ful, such as Famous Amos and FedEx. This may be the true
“omitted,” unobservable, variable that has complicated
researchers’ estimations.
The presumption that the mere presence of a business
plan will lead to positive firm performance assumes that the
business plan represents a good idea which has been well
written. Such a simplistic approach ignores the actual com-
plexities: to be beneficial to a firm, its business plan must
Business Plan 
Is/Details:
Poorly Composed Well Composed
A Tenable
Concept
This type of business plan
may lead to positive firm 
performance, but it may
overlook critical details due
to poor execution, leading to
implementation problems.
The firm may be successful
despite its business plan
rather than because of it.
“planning” poor 
performance
A good concept that is well
written is the most likely 
situation whereby a written
business plan will be positive-
ly related to firm success.
This is what researchers
implicitly assume. However,
it is also only one of four 





Despite the presence of a
written business plan, this
situation will be correlated
with poor firm performance.
“planning” poor 
performance
This type of business plan
looks good, but resembles
“lipstick on a pig.”  A well-
written plan is not a 
substitute for a sound 
concept. This situation 




Figure 1. Omitted Variable Bias:
The Empirical Relationship between Written 
Business Plans and Firm Performance
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embody a sound business concept, and must be well written.
These, along with a large portion of sheer luck and pockets
full of capital, may be the bare essentials of a successful firm.
Attempts at humor aside, there is no a priori reason to
assume the mere existence of a business plan should be cor-
related with firm success. Failure to properly account for this
complexity is one reason for the empirical difficulty linking
business plans with firm success.
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Endnote
1 However, Perry (2001) and Parks, Olson, and Bokor (1991) found that very few small firms actually create business plans.
Carland and Carland (2003) suggest that evaluating entrepreneurs’ use of business plans may be the wrong direction to go,
as they question the extent to which entrepreneurs actually engage in this traditional form of planning.
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In the Beginning…(Part A)
In August 2002, when the Dow Jones Industrial Average
dipped under 8000, Davis and Hodgetts, friends, coauthors,
and fellow English professors, lamented their desiccated
retirement funds. Neither was getting any richer on a faculty
member’s salary nor expected any windfalls from relatives,
their book sales, or lottery tickets. After a long discussion,
they decided that they needed to become masters of their
own economic fate. Richard Davis had done enough prelimi-
nary research on the real estate market in their area to con-
vince Hodgetts (who had a bad experience renting his house
several summers ago) that there was money to be made
becoming what Hodgetts half jokingly called “slum lords.” In
September 2002, they formed D&H LLC, each investing
$50,000, with the idea of buying a total of 10 homes by the
following year.
Davis and Hodgetts, with the assistance of Davis’s real
estate agent, found renters in three months and worked with
these families to find them homes in the $175,000 price
range that the families would be happy to lease with the
option to buy.The rentals were so attractive that Davis and
Hodgetts even had a waiting list for new tenants. Davis and
Hodgetts easily qualified for mortgages but found that the
interest rates were higher than they expected as the homes
were purchased as rental properties and not primary resi-
dences.They decided to put 10 percent down on each prop-
erty and to use a three-year adjustable rate mortgage to drop
the interest rate and their monthly expenses to about $900 a
month. They also found that they needed to invest another
$10,000 into each home for real estate brokerage fees, appli-
ances, interior design, and landscaping. The six homes they
had purchased gobbled up their initial investment of
$100,000 and required an additional $80,000 (which
Hodgetts loaned the company).Their net profit was $1,500 a
month, certainly not enough funds to purchase the planned
additional four homes, but enough funds in their minds to
merit continuation of the business. Property values of these
homes were rising at about 10 per year. Hence, the real eco-
nomic benefit derived from the business would be realized at
the end of the three-year lease, when the renters either
bought their homes or when the homes would be resold.
Davis and Hodgetts purchased only newly constructed
homes for their rental business.This reduced their time spent
managing the properties and attracted the interested renters
who would be willing to purchase their house at the end of
the three-year lease. Davis and Hodgetts believed that these
new homes would have minimal repair problems over the
three-year time span of the lease and that they would there-
fore have little, if any, interface with any subcontractors (i.e.,
carpenters, plumbers, electricians, gardeners) in the future.3
For Davis and Hodgetts the rental business was supposed to
be a sideline to their academic careers and certainly was not
going to cut into their quality time as academics.
Any problems with the six properties (and there were
very few) when Richard Davis was not at home to answer
renters’ calls,Adrienne Davis, Richard’s wife, resolved. She
would contact the home’s building contractor. Work that
was performed on the newly purchased homes (one home
had a flooding problem) was covered by the builder’s war-
ranty, therefore, there were no out-of-pocket expenses.
Any phone traffic or other day-to-day activities related to
the business, what little there was, was usually handled by
Mrs. Davis since Drs. Davis and Hodgetts spent much of
their time at the university. This included collecting rent
checks, paying the properties’ mortgages, and making
bank deposits.
Case Study
DHR Construction, LLC1: Parts A and B
Herbert Sherman
Daniel J. Rowley
Stephen Hodgetts read the e-mail over and over againand still could hardly believe what he had read. Hehad just come back from his vacation, well rested
and refreshed, and this e-mail had dampened his high
enthusiasm. It took time to absorb such bad news and for
Hodgetts to get over his incredulity.Yet in the end Hodgetts
accepted the truth—a deep, dark terrible truth that would
not go away. Robert Davis, his business partner’s son, had
confirmed in an e-mail his worst fears about their newest
business partner, David Russ.Many thoughts were running
through his mind simultaneously yet each screamed to be
heard.“How could he and his partner Richard Davis have
been so blind, so trusting?” “How could Russ not have heed-
ed the advice of his business partner, Richard Davis, Russ’s
former English professor?”And most important, “What was
now going to happen to their new business?”Yet the one
thought that continued to echo among them all was sur-
prisingly a quote from Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s beloved
character, Sherlock Holmes: “But there are always some
lunatics about. It would be a dull world without them.”
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A Short-Term Solution and a 
New Game Plan
Their solution to raising cash for down payments on new
rental properties was to finish off the basements of their
renters’ apartments, and then remortgage their properties.
They could finish the basements off for approximately
$20,000 per home and increase the appraised value of the
property by nearly $30,000. If they did this for all six homes,
they could raise $60,000. While talking with their renters
about the possibility of finishing off their basements, they
discovered that one couple, Alan and Wilma, were not only
willing to finish off their own basement but would be will-
ing to finish the basements of the other houses for $5,000
less per home.
The work was well underway to finishing off the base-
ments of their six rental units in April 2003. Alan and Wilma
formed their own LLC and completed three basements
(including their own) while Davis and Hodgetts refinanced
those three homes and were able to clear about $45,000.
With these funds, they purchased an additional two homes
bringing their total number of rental units to eight.
It was late April when Davis was approached by one of his
most recent graduates, Russ, who was designing their base-
ments including drawing the blueprints, about cutting out
the middleperson in terms of the rental business by building
their own homes. Russ, a young man who had just recently
graduated from Davis and Hodgetts’ university with a degree
in business administration (specialization in management),
worked in the home construction industry for several years
part-time as both a general construction worker, and then as
an assistant designer. During the past year Russ had formed
his own LLC (DR Architectural Designs),with the intention of
going into the business full-time once he graduated from col-
lege. Working for Davis and Hodgetts designing basements
was quite fortuitous for Russ who saw real opportunity in
this new venture of home construction.
Russ acted as the contractor. Although he never served as
a contractor before, he felt quite confident that his industry
experience and his educational background in business pro-
vided him with the skills necessary for managing a home
construction project. More importantly, given his prior work
experience, he knew all of the subcontractors in the area
who were needed to construct new homes.He felt confident
in his ability to work well with people whom he considered
his friends and to manage the process.Russ had taken numer-
ous courses on motivation, leadership, and business opera-
tions and knew that his college education would serve him
well on his first major managerial position.
Davis was highly impressed with Russ’s hard work and
dedication as a student in his class and felt that these traits
would carry over well to the work environment. Davis had
known Russ to be an affable and capable student and
vouched for his character to Hodgetts. Alan and Wilma
would do the interior work, and/or Alan could hire some
part-time workers to help him. In any event, Davis and
Hodgetts would build the rest of their homes under a differ-
ent company name,sell it to themselves for a profit, and then
make a profit renting the homes. Davis estimated that on a
$150,000 home they could net a 20 percent profit; $30,000
over the two- to three-month time period it would take to
build one home.
A New Entrepreneurial Venture—The
Birth of DHR Construction, LLC
In talking with Davis about this project,Russ noticed that the
team of Davis and Hodgetts, academics by training, had many
of the same characteristics that his course on entrepreneur-
ship taught him were critical in becoming successful start-up
business owners.These traits included:high drive and energy
level, self-confidence, setting challenging but realistic goals,
using money as a measure of performance, persistent prob-
lem-solvers, moderate risk takers, taking initiative and taking
personal responsibility, and making good use of resources.4
Russ was further impressed with the operation of Davis and
Hodgetts’ current enterprise since it was clear to him that
this was more than just a hobby business—Davis and
Hodgetts were depending on the rental business for their
future retirement income.
Hodgetts met Russ for the first time at the signing of the
LLC agreement and they seemed to hit it off quite well.Their
lengthy discussions about the business confirmed Russ’s
observation about Davis and Hodgetts’ entrepreneurial bent.
Yet looking back upon this conversation an objective observ-
er might note that certain issues were surprisingly absent
from this discussion as well as any previous discussions
about the new venture; specifically the marketing and pro-
moting of the business, networking techniques, and initial
preparation for the new venture.5
According to the agreement, Davis and Hodgetts would
have controlling interest in the firm (37.5% each) while Russ
would be a minority shareholder at 25 percent. No one con-
sulted a lawyer about the contract, which they all had been
given a copy of ahead time. Davis assured both Hodgetts and
Russ that this was a standard LLC agreement—one in fact he
took off of the Internet and was written given their particu-
lar state’s LLC’s requirements. After much hemming and haw-
ing by Hodgetts, who tended to object to any new venture
proposed by Davis, Hodgetts and Davis formed a construc-
tion company with Russ, DHR Construction, LLC.
DHR developed a simple business model. Homes would
be priced at 20 percent above cost. Russ would act as the
architectural designer and contractor. His job was to work
with the subcontractors to ensure that their work met sched-
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ule and building code requirements, and to make sure that
subcontractors’ bills coincided with the work provided. Russ
was to bill DHR Construction, LLC for his services under his
own LLC, leaving DHR with no salaried employees. Davis
handled the back office functions of the business (hiring an
accountant, pricing out homes, bidding out work to subcon-
tractors, working with real estate agents, and mortgage com-
panies) while Hodgetts played creditor and bankrolled the
company’s upfront expenses. Hodgetts also took a more
active role in Davis’s and Hodgetts’ academic career by
becoming first author on several books and journal articles
that he and Davis were jointly working on.
The business was progressing quite nicely—in the opin-
ion of Hodgetts, Davis, and Russ. Davis had located a bank
that offered them construction loans at 75 percent of the
estimated retail value of the homes to be built for a compet-
itive lending rate,6 thus requiring at most a 5 percent loan
from Hodgetts to cover minor expenses (assuming a 20%
profit margin per home).Norma, their home rental agent,had
found them vacant property in the same general vicinity of
their rental properties, with each parcel running between
$40,000 to $45,000.Their mortgage company for their rental
units offered them extremely favorable mortgage rates if
Hodgetts and Davis decided to buy their own homes for
rental purposes. In the interim, Hodgetts lined up a publish-
er for a fictional piece of work that he and Davis had always
wanted to write—The Bard Meets Sherlock Holmes.
Hodgetts drafted an outline of the text which received very
favorable reviews from the publisher.
Russ, their new business partner, was also quite busy. He
lined up all of the subcontractors needed to build their
homes (including Alan and Wilma who would handle framing
and walling) and developed several designs for homes in the
1250 to 1400 square foot range that would sell for $165,000
to $185,000.Russ’s homes included some added features that
differentiated them from other houses in a similar price
range, (i.e., more windows, including a garage window, nicer
lighting fixtures, upgraded appliances, nicer counters, cabi-
nets, and flooring) including a distinctive California design,
featuring an oversized master bathroom, archways, high ceil-
ings, and unique fireplaces. The three partners agreed with
their real estate agent that many of these upgrades added
minimal cost to the overall price of the home and accentuat-
ed customer value.
Of Mice and Men
The strategy was to immediately construct two homes based
on the plans developed by Russ.Each property was to be pur-
chased by each of the majority shareholders (Hodgetts and
Davis) who would then quick title the land to their property
management company, D&H Management. These contribu-
tions represented each owner’s equity investment in DHR
Construction. Russ’s contribution came in the form of sweat
equity—much of the startup work on these homes was per-
formed for free although his firm was paid for the architec-
tural drawings.
Construction loans were then obtained based on Russ’s
architectural drawings, Davis’s cost analyses, and the real
estate agent’s assessment of a competitive selling price for
the property.Hodgetts was on a sabbatical feverishly working
on The Bard Meets Sherlock Holmes and contributed the
least to the day-to-day operations, although, he attended all of
the company’s meetings.The ground was broken quickly,pic-
tures were snapped of the event, company t-shirts and hats
were distributed to owners and subcontractors alike, and
construction was well underway. Adrienne Davis, who had
recently received her MBA, even got into the DHR operation
(for no compensation) by organizing meetings and coordi-
nating communications between the office (Davis’s home)
and the construction site.
While on the surface everything seemed to be going fine,
an undercurrent of discontent was running through the
ranks of DHR’s subcontractors, especially Alan and Wilma.
They complained bitterly to Adrienne that Russ was both
crude and rude in his dealings with them, and the other sub-
contractors, and that Russ had threatened to fire them if they
protested his actions to Davis and Hodgetts. Other subcon-
tractors were complaining to both Davis and Adrienne that
they had be called into a project by Russ either too early,
when the work was incomplete (and therefore they could
not do their own work), or too late (they’d have to work
around someone else’s work). Property was also disappear-
ing from the work sites, especially with wrong orders where
goods would have to be picked up for return by the deliver-
er. Both homes were running over budget and the quality of
the work being performed was inconsistent and not always
up to building codes.
In May 2003, less than two weeks into construction,
Adrienne decided to intervene and have a chat with Russ.She
gave him a chance to reflect on the feedback that she was
getting. She told Hodgetts in an e-mail that “my lunch with
Russ went well.We brainstormed bringing his wife into the
business as a PR representative.Meaning, she would schedule
the subs,bake cookies for them,and visit the job site to listen
to concerns.That would take pressure off Russ and make him
a better manager.There are still rough edges on him, but he
enjoyed our time together. I’ll do it again.” Hodgetts replied,
“Russ is young, inexperienced, and probably a bit over his
head—a normal reaction would be to give orders and criti-
cize others but I’m sure that you can break him of this habit!”
Davis seemed less concerned than his wife about Russ’s
behavior—no one had complained to Davis about Russ and
when Russ and Richard (Davis) were together on the site,
everything seemed fine and everyone seemed happy.
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The Plot Thickens
According to Adrienne, however the situation was getting
worse.“My anger toward David Russ continues to grow,” she
confided in Hodgetts a week after the meeting.“Now I have
learned that he may be undermining our relationship with
various subs. He rushed the roofers to finish. Now the heat-
ing people have to drill holes and repair them to finish their
part. He is unrealistic about deadlines.We may lose business
over his behavior.That is unacceptable to me.”
“Alan is the one who smoothes things over for us once
Russ has left the job site.Thank God for Alan! Russ needs to
know it’s not just me, Adrienne, who is upset about his
behavior. He writes me off because I’m a woman, and he
believes that I don’t understand the nature of the construc-
tion business. I don’t buy that one! These are people issues
that pertain to any business.”Adrienne then took a long pause
in which to catch her breath.
“I have counseled Russ to speak more softly and to give
Alan permission to question him and ask for clarifications. I
have also counseled Alan to speak up and not take Russ’s
behaviors to heart. Alan is such a gentle spirit. Russ is such a
bull. We’ll see how time plays out with these discussions.
Russ wonders why he doesn’t get more respect. There’s a
topic to explore with him.Respect doesn’t come from yelling
orders at people.He has no sense of how to express gratitude
to our subcontractors. It’s all about him.
Richard is tired of talking about it. He just wants things to
go away. I know they won’t without some action. I asked
Richard to consider using Russ in another role, or dissolving
the corporation.This is a small college town and word gets
around. I don’t want his attitude to bring us down.We have
such a wonderful team otherwise.” She took another long
breath before she continued.
“Stephen, would you be willing to address this issue with
Russ?  I think he is in over his head and doesn’t really know
how to function with people on the job site. His ego is huge.
If he brings relatives around to show off the place, he is
worse, giving everyone orders as if he runs the place. He cre-
ates an unhealthy workplace environment. Perhaps some
words from you about being humble and caring would have
an impact. Hearing the message from several places might
help it sink in.Thanks for listening.”
Hodgetts was placed in a real bind. He respected
Adrienne’s opinions and thought very highly of her ability to
read people.He also valued his long-time writing partner and
could not believe that Richard would overlook such a glaring
problem. Russ might be Davis’s former student but Hodgetts
could not imagine Davis coddling Russ. He hoped that his
reply to Adrienne would be both thoughtful and diplomatic.
“You have posed a real conundrum for me since I am not
involved with the day-to-day operations and I have no real
contact with the subcontractors. I am therefore even more
removed, at least in Russ’s eyes, than you are from the busi-
ness. Advice from me at this point, if you pardon the expres-
sion, would be like pissing into the wind.”
Adrienne looked a bit perturbed but seemed to accept
Hodgetts’ comments with grace. Hodgetts continued, “I
think that you and Richard need to sit down with Russ and
his wife and have a good clearing of the air. Richard needs
to set the ground rules, explain that he is the principal
owner and therefore the boss, and discuss with Russ our
way of working with people. I’m sure that Richard and Russ
can work these things out once everyone puts their cards
on the table.”
The Meeting
Hodgetts had a nice chat with Davis who concurred that a
meeting would put this issue to bed once and for all. The
meeting went well according to Davis. “I had a very good
chat with Russ, who brought his wife, yesterday afternoon.
His wife was far more upset and angry than Russ,well at least
that’s the way it appeared, but we talked through all of the
issues.Adrienne is not convinced that Russ is changing that
much, but I don’t particularly agree.Alan and Wilma have to
be more assertive and speak up for themselves rather than
tell Adrienne about their problems.This will keep Adrienne
from then getting angry on their behalf. Anyway, at the
moment, I think things will settle down.”
Adrienne had a slightly different perspective but agreed
with the outcome.“Richard asked me to stay for the meet-
ing with Russ. Russ brought his wife, as she was upset as
well. It was good. They needed to be angry and express
their frustrations. Amazingly, none of this upsets me. I
embrace the challenge of understanding. No tears!  We left
with everyone feeling better. I can’t say the discussion is
over, as Russ doesn’t express any ownership of the prob-
lems.” In a mocking, sarcastic tone she continued, “There
needs to be bosses. He is doing alright. He’s done it all. He
has lots of expertise. On and on. He talks fast and loud. I just
listened. Richard spoke out of his frustrations with the
issues. Mostly to have this resolved, as he is tired of this non-
sense!  Russ’s wife does hear and hopefully will help Russ
to see what needs to happen.”
From Hodgetts’ standpoint the meeting actually turned
out better than expected. He was sure that Richard would
put in his two cents in terms of who calls the shots and that
Richard would reiterate the need for Russ to be a team play-
er. He was also certain that Russ would see this problem as
an issue of competence (not compassion) and that Russ
unfortunately would not understand that it isn’t always the
smartest person who makes a good manager, it is the one
who possesses excellent interpersonal skills.
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When the Mice Are Away
It was only a few weeks later, in early July, that Richard Davis
and his wife planned a two-week trip to Europe, after Davis’s
summer term was over. Davis was scheduled to present a
paper (co-authored by Hodgetts) at a conference in Spain
and hoped to take a break from the business by traveling a
bit in Europe. Hodgetts had plans of his own that also took
him away from the area and therefore Davis’s son Robert was
left to represent both Davis and Hodgetts’ interests while
they were away.Both signed proxies giving Robert the formal
authority to act on their behalf.Robert was slightly older than
Russ,had worked as a paralegal, and was currently the admin-
istrative assistant to the chief financial officer of the local
hospital. Robert had originally planned to tour Europe with
his parents but opted to use his vacation from work to stay
home and mind the business. Robert scheduled a luncheon
appointment with each of the subcontractors during the
time his parents were away to give him a chance to connect
with all of the subcontractors and catch up on events.
The two weeks in Europe were quite blissful for Davis and
his wife—they received no emergency calls, kept in touch
with Robert via e-mail, and enjoyed the scenery and wines of
Spain, Portugal, and France. Hodgetts was also well rested,
having spent time away from work gathering background
information for future writings and enjoying some time off
from his intensive writing schedule. When they came back






Just thought you should be aware of some things that are going on and issues that will be addressed today.
After spending a week at the helm of the business while my parents were out of the country, I became very aware of
some issues that were going on within the company.
I know for a fact that the situation with Russ is getting worse by the day. I had lunch with Wilma on Thursday, during
which she reluctantly provided some rather distressing information about his behavior on the site (in front of her chil-
dren in a few cases). After our lunch, I phoned Russ’s wife and left a message asking to have lunch with her the next day
to get her perception on how things were going with scheduling and the progress on the houses. (I mentioned nothing of
my meeting with Wilma). Somehow, however, this all got back to Russ. The fact that I was speaking to others outside of
him caused him to become quite agitated. He proceeded to threaten Alan and Wilma (in front of his own wife) saying that
no one was to speak to anyone but him and that he would report any information necessary to either myself or my par-
ents.
I was not aware of this particular incident as it was happening, but I did quickly become aware that something had hap-
pened because Wilma called me a few hours after our lunch (post-threat) and in a very shaky, scared, and (like a witness
to a mob hit) begged for me to forget everything she had told me. She rapidly denied what she had said and told me not
to breathe a word. Instinctually, I knew Russ had gotten to her somehow (I didn't hear about the threat until
Saturday—two days after the fact when everything was calmer). I've had enough experience in life to tell me when
someone has been threatened. At the time I didn't know what had happened, but I knew without a doubt something had
taken place.
I bit my tongue, however, and fought off all my immediate impulses to find Russ and bluntly tell him that I will speak to
whomever I damn well please, that I will talk to everyone to get the whole story on everything that goes on with this
project, and that he had no right to address one of our dearest subs in that fashion. But as he seems to feed off of con-
frontation, I stayed calm and quiet.
Meanwhile, I have heard things from some of our subs (our carpenter, particularly irritated by our horrible scheduling
that caused him to wait four hours to complete his tasks on our first home). They are not happy—no matter what they
tell Russ to his face, and what I hear behind the scenes is not pleasant. 
I received calls from Russ almost daily telling me things were ok, but when I checked in with other people, that's not
what I'm told.
I have to say that I am beginning to feel uncomfortable around Russ. The way he keeps his wife silent. The speed at
which he responds when I talk in confidence with other persons within the group to keep them from contacting me again.
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Dissolving Partnerships (Part B)
The die had been cast and the sisters of fate, with scissors
poised for action, awaited the time of the cutting of the
thread. It was July 2003 and Hodgetts and Davis reluctantly
agreed that they needed to rid themselves of their co-owner,
Russ, given the negative reports they had received from their
subcontractors and business associates. Russ’s arrogance,
coupled with his threatening approach when dealing with
subcontractors, made him an immediate liability that would
quickly blow up in their faces. Both Davis’s wife and son
found Russ’s behavior intolerable; evidently these behaviors
were not going to be corrected in the near term. Davis was
forced to choose between his family and his business partner
and his business partner drew the short straw.
Davis was especially disturbed, since Russ was a former
student of his, and hoped that he could have mentored Russ
over the long term of the business and groom him to take
over both businesses (D&H Management,DHR Construction)
when he and Hodgetts retired (within the next five to ten
years). Such was just not to be the case. Davis currently did
not have the time necessary (given his teaching and office
responsibilities) to provide Russ the day-to-day supervision
he apparently needed to properly run the business and it was
evident that Adrienne could not serve in that capacity.
Without coaching and counseling from Davis, a business
meltdown seemed imminent if Russ were to continue to stay
involved in the business.
The Dagger Is Drawn
It was during one of Hodgetts and Davis’s friendly weekly
gatherings, a custom that now included family members and
subcontractors from the business, that they both decided to
adjourn to a separate room in Davis’s house to discuss the
matter discretely. Hodgetts had just finished describing a pos-
sible twist ending to their co-authored book The Bard Meets
Sherlock Holmes and was intently listening to Davis’s reac-
tion, which of course was delivered in the tradition of the
great detective. “I never get your limits, Hodgetts. There are
unexplored possibilities about you.7 At present I am, as you
know, fairly busy, but I propose to devote my declining years
to the composition of a textbook which shall focus the whole
art of detection into one volume.8 You,my dear Hodgetts,have
captured the essence of that art in the last chapter and are to
be congratulated for a marvelous piece of work.”
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The instinctual discomfort I felt when I was standing by him and he was holding a hammer like a talking stick (though I
knew he wouldn't hit me, I still felt like I should stand out of arm's reach). All of this is disquieting to me. 
I have tried to remain as neutral a presence as possible. I have always tried to keep a polite, professional attitude
around them. I have invited his wife to lunches, to celebrations, and to chat. And the thing that really gets to me is that
she will only engage if she has his permission.
This is not a healthy arrangement. I now liken him to a cancer within the group, slowly eating away at the strength,
integrity, and unity that were first present in our team...except that now we're not a team at all. We are a series of sin-
gle units coexisting to bring this project to an end.
This saddens me as I felt (and still feel) this project, this company, this idea is a wonderful brain child that should not
be coerced to continue. The joy and prosperity it has the potential to bring is extraordinary. But, sadly, there is one
piece that is acting as the broken link in this dream and it needs to be taken care of immediately. I don't know how; I
just know that it must be soon...for everyone's sake.
Please understand, I do not enjoy making these statements. I wish to see everything work out for the best. But, try as I
did over this past week to make everything better, I fear that I did not do enough to keep it from getting worse.
The houses are wonderful, but the company is strained. I quietly wish that there was something I could do to make it
right. But this is beyond me. My suggestions have been: (1) move Russ to a subcontractor role where he does not have the
possibility of asserting false authority; (2) Richard (dad) must be on the site more frequently to observe the progress
and interactions first hand (everyone has said that things are better when he's around, so therefore it only makes sense
that he make his presence a more common sight); and (3) we need to assert again and again the rules, job descriptions,
and ideals of this company. There must be no doubt who we are and what we are here for. 
Thank you for allowing me to rant in my report in such a lengthy fashion. I do feel these issues must be brought to light
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“Thank you, thank you,” replied Hodgetts. He was smiling
from ear to ear and Davis could tell that Hodgetts was very
pleased with himself and with Davis’s response to Hodgetts’
work. Hodgetts had never taken on such a heavy portion of
the work load before in their co-authorship and hoped to sat-
isfy Davis’s high standards.“I wish that we could deal with
Russ as easily as Mr. Holmes dealt with the Bard imposter in
Chapter 7. For now is the winter of our discontent.9 We have
seen better days10 and what is done is done.11 For to mourn a
mischief that is past and gone is the next way to draw new
mischief on.12 So,brave Richard,how might we draw this dag-
ger from our chests?”
Richard Davis had switched his mindset into business
mode and dropped his Holmes persona.“This is quite diffi-
cult for me as you well know, Stephen. Russ was a student of
mine and I encouraged him to become involved in our busi-
ness. I thought I knew him and clearly I have misread his
character. I know that I’m not to blame but I can’t help feel-
ing somewhat responsible for Russ—maybe he just wasn’t
ready to take on such an important position.We must under-
stand that we are in essence not only losing a fellow owner
but also firing our building contractor. In any event, I think
that we should make him a very nice offer,one that is beyond
our ownership agreement.”
Davis continued, “Between the two of us we have the
majority of shares and therefore Russ has no choice but to
leave the company if we so vote. If we were to dissolve the
corporation or buy him out, the contract reads that we’d split
the company’s equity based upon our ownership.That being
said, Russ would receive 25 percent of $30,000 ($7,500)
minus the salary he drew on this upcoming home building
project.”
“I have no problem offering him a little more money than
he is due,” concurred Hodgetts.“What did you have in mind
in terms of a buyout settlement?”
Heart of Gold
“First” responded Davis,“I would like us to buy his architec-
tural designs for the homes we’ve built.We have four separate
designs, at $1,000 apiece that’s $4,000. I would also like him
to have the special plotter which DHR bought which prints
the architectural plans, that’s worth another $3,000.” “That
sounds quite generous,” quipped Hodgetts. Hodgetts was
about to continue about the virtues of generosity when Davis
interrupted him.
“I’m not done. I also think that we need to help Russ start
his own construction company.We owe him that much.He is
the one who introduced us to all of the subcontractors and
he certainly was instrumental in getting this business started.
I suggest that we help him finance his business, more specif-
ically, I would like us to countersign any loans that Russ
would have to take out to build his first three homes. This
would include real estate and construction loans.There is no
way that Russ could swing these types of loans given his cur-
rent credit situation. Remember that one of the homes that
we are building is his and his money will be heavily tied up
in that home.”
Hodgetts was silent and Davis knew that this was not a
good sign. Hodgetts had been playing banker for the compa-
ny, his major role in the building projects, and was very cau-
tious as to how the firm’s money was spent. Davis expected
a very snide remark, undoubtedly a quote from the Bard
about being neither a borrower nor a lender, and was pre-
pared for the worst. Hodgetts, who was normally as pre-
dictable as the tides, threw Davis for a loop.“An excellent set-
tlement package” Hodgetts said with the greatest sincerity.
“What did you have in mind in terms of lending rates? I
would like us to make one percent over our own borrowing
rate plus 2 percent of the profit from each house.
Considering that we usually plan a 20 percent profit margin,
I don’t think 2 percent is being too greedy.”
Davis was impressed with Hodgetts’easy concurrence and
thought that the old boy might actually have a kind streak in
him after all.“It’s settled then,” Davis remarked.“I’ll set up a
meeting with Russ so that we can go through the entire set-
tlement proposal. I know that we’re being overly benevolent
but I think that we’re making him an offer that he really can-
not refuse.”
“Perhaps,”Hodgetts interjected,“You might meet with him
alone, one on one so to speak.This is a very delicate situation
and I think that you should break the news to him gently,
teacher to student, where Russ won’t feel overwhelmed by
both of us putting pressure on him. He needs to understand
that we have voted him out of the business but that we are
offering him far more than his fair share. He also needs to
understand that we are not only doing this for the good of
the business but for his own good as well.” Davis and
Hodgetts agreed on this tactic and then rejoined the get
together of subcontractors and family members.
Davis’s Meeting with Russ
It was a busy week for Hodgetts and Davis so Hodgetts was
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The End Is Near—Or Is It?
Davis, Hodgetts, and Russ met for breakfast in August 2003 to
finally iron out the buyout agreement.The meeting went very
well,with the agreement including all of the extras that Davis
and Hodgetts had discussed and excluding any side agree-
ment with Russ for consulting services. Russ was to continue
supervision of the building of the three homes that were
near completion, and that he was drawing a salary from, but
was excluded from all other building sites of DHR
Construction. Everyone left with a signed copy of the agree-
ment, hand shakes, and a feeling that all had been settled. But
had it?
In Hodgetts and Davis’s next weekly meeting, it became
plain that events were not transpiring as planned.“Russ still
pokes his nose in where it doesn’t belong, but I tell people
to ignore him," Davis commented.“The latest,he told Bob the
painter he couldn’t paint the Wexford, one of our new
homes, this weekend because the door wasn’t in yet. I told
Bob to ignore Russ and work on our schedule. I don’t know
what’s wrong with this kid. He just doesn’t get it.”
“He doesn’t get it, does he?” replied Hodgetts.“Perhaps we
need to remind him that it is a breach of contract to visit our
sites, especially those he is not involved with, and that we
would be more than happy to go back to the original agree-
ment of merely splitting the assets from the three sales. Has
he started to work on developing his own projects? If not, it
may be a good idea to have a quick wake-up call with him.
He needs to be reminded that he needs to concentrate in get-
ting his own business off the ground. The clock is ticking
since in our agreement, we gave him six months in which to
use our financial support.”
Several weeks went by and the situation was worsening.
Davis was livid and did not mince words with Hodgetts.
“Regarding Russ—I’m going to be buying a gun this after-
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You handled this very well and you made him a generous offer—more than I would have to begin the discussion. Your ini-
tial offer puts cash in his pocket, about $15K from what I remember, and that should be equal to three months of living
expenses. Since we will be helping him on the financing side of his first three homes then what does he need more cash
for? I want to help the guy but we have to be very careful about our own cash flow and our own needs—like paying our-
selves back our initial investments and paying me back on my short-term loans!
In terms of him working for us, in all candor, I do not know if we want any of his wisdom since it comes with a
heavy price—I would rather pay for you to take a course on home construction or hire someone else. We need to distance
ourselves from him ASAP if we are to keep your wife and the subcontractors on friendly terms.
Hodgett’s e-mail reply was succinct and to the point:
Sorry I did not get back to you sooner on the events of Monday and today. On top of everything else, my allergies are
kicking in like gang-busters and I just want to hibernate! Anyway, yesterday's lunch with Russ went well. I did not share
with him any written proposal or agreement, because I wanted to go through the issues first, gain agreement, and then
go to more official documents. I approached this from the point of view that he and the two of us are going in different
directions, both in terms of the short term (management style) and longer term (he wants to become a developer, and at
least I don't). I suggested we begin to break up the company with him using his own LLC as a vehicle to construct three
homes, with our financial backing. At the end of lunch (1 1/2 hours) we were on very good terms. He admitted that he
thought I was going to fire him, and I tried to reassure him that wasn't the way I work. I'm a problem solver, not a
problem maker. He seemed more relieved than anything. 
Today I met with Russ out on the site for another hour. He had had time to think and talk it over with his wife
and had some more questions. He is concerned about three things: (1) the salary issue, which I said I hadn't had time to
process yet, but since salary would be coming out of his equity position, we could buy him out and give him the cash up
front (he seemed interested); (2) how he could move forward on three homes, build and sell them in a short period of
time; and (3) he really does not want to cut ties with you or me—and he is offering to teach me everything he knows
about the management side for some sort of management fee. 
Initially, he said we could pay him an 8 percent management fee, but I said that was half our profits and that
would never fly, so he backed way off. I know Adrienne will go ballistic if we entered into any sort of management agree-
ment for one or two years, so I said to Russ that I'd need to think about it and chat with you. But overall, he is in full
agreement with our decision. I've made it crystal clear to him that he is not to give Alan or Wilma or anyone else any
direction, criticism, or his wisdom—all of that is to go through me now, and he has fully agreed.
I think he is basically a good kid. He's still a bit immature and has an anger problem, but I don't doubt his sin-
cerity or honesty. This is the right decision—for him to move on and for us to go our own way, but I don't think it has to
be based on rancor or pettiness. I'm trying my best to keep personalities out of the discussion and focus on future
directions. I've got several hurdles to overcome with Russ and with Adrienne before we get to a final agreement, but I
think a full separation is at hand. I just want to do it gently—this will take more time, but I think everyone will benefit in
the end.
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noon.The delightful boy is hot on the rumor mill, and is try-
ing to sabotage us. He told Keith at West Point Interiors
(that’s our carpet, tile guy) that we’re bankrupt and going out
of business and that I’m firing our employees before the end
of the week. He’s told our other subs pretty much the same
things and they’re all upset. My wife is making cookies and I
will meet with all the subs this afternoon and dispel this one.
I think he’s psychotic.
I am also meeting with the other David, our mortgage spe-
cialist, at 1p.m. today to specifically discuss Russ. It turns out
that Russ’s credit scores have plummeted, and he no longer
qualifies for a mortgage. I know Russ wants us to buy the
place we are building for himself and then lease it to him
with the option to buy, and we probably will, since that
house is going to be hard to sell to someone else. I was sup-
posed to meet with David Russ this morning, but was so
depressed that I couldn’t get out of bed, so I’m meeting with
him on Friday for a real come-to-Jesus meeting.Threats will
be involved.
You and I have not signed any guarantees for Russ on his
new ventures, and I’m thinking of withholding them based
on all this going on. Getting stuck with his house is bad
enough, but getting stuck with three more would be beyond
my tolerance.
In the interim, Russ has hired a lawyer to try to renegoti-
ate the deal that had already been signed and agreed on,most
specifically dealing with the issue of how Russ was now not
able to obtain financing for the home that DHR Construction
was building for him.”
Hodgetts was shocked, not only at the turn of events but
how his colleague had become so incensed about Russ. He
responded in a like, harsh tone.“I have no qualms breaking
our agreement with Russ if we can document that he has
interfered with our business (i.e., spreading these rumors,
showing up at our work sites).There is a law against slander
and I think he needs to be reminded that he is responsible for
his actions.
In terms of his house, if he cannot qualify for a mortgage,
then he should ask his parents to cosign the loan for him. I
really do not want to enter any business deals with Russ and
would much rather sue him if he is going to breach our con-
tract about the house. How is he going to make rental pay-
ments? In all candor, I can be a very spiteful guy if someone
tries to screw with me and my partners. I would be happy to
just buy his house outright (at our cost), rent it, sell it, or just
own it as a second home. If we get stuck with his house, my
feeling is that we have satisfied our agreement with Russ and
that he is on his own. Boy, is this kid self-destructive! Looks
like he wants to get punished! I wish I could be at the meet-
ing on Friday but as you know I have my two classes to teach.”
Yee Gods, What Was That?
The meeting in late August with Russ went as Davis and
Hodgetts expected. Russ denied the spreading of rumors to
Davis while Davis reminded him that any of these actions
violated the noninvolvement clause in the originally signed
contract. Davis also reminded Russ that he was responsible
for the cost overruns in his own home and that those over-
runs would come out of his profits from the eventual sale of
the home.
A few days later, in early September, Hodgetts received the
following e-mail from Russ:
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I wanted to first take the opportunity to tell you thank-you for giving my wife and me the opportunity to be part of DHR
with you. It is unfortunate that it didn't work out the way we had originally planned. Things here have been pretty good.
I don't know if you have heard yet or not. I had to pull out of the house. Due to us being self-employed and my wife not
having a job due to student teaching this semester, the mortgage company's rate changed and they were saying that the
mortgage would be around $1,600 per month, which we couldn't afford. So we decided that we would go a different
direction in regards to a house. Currently we are living with my parents until January. 
On another note I was wondering if you would be interested in investing in my new company privately outside of
DHR and Richard Davis. Right now I am looking to raise 20 to 25 percent of the building cost for the bank to give the
loans to me in my own name. I have worked up a promissory note, which states that I would return to you in six months
the initial sum along with a 10 percent return. The one house I am currently seeking money for would need an investment
of $50,000. This house is a 1,265 square foot house, which will be built in the Westridge Village subdivision, which is
where I was initially going to build my house. The community in which the homes will be built in will be a maintenance-free
patio home community. They all have rear loaded garages and large front porches. Each house is designed in a 1920s cot-
tage/craftsman style.  If you could please e-mail me or call me and let me know if this sounds like an investment you
would be interested in, I would appreciate it.
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O.K. Genius, Now What?
Davis and Hodgetts had tons to talk about at their next week-
ly meeting. Davis, brandy in hand, immediately launched into
a vigorous discussion of the Russ situation. “Just when you
thought it was safe to go back into the water…The guy’s
delusional! Not only does he not share any of his thoughts
with me on his problems with the breakup,but then he pulls
this stunt! I assume you’re playing with him, Hodgetts, you
can’t be serious about investing in him I’m sure.”
Hodgetts allowed a few moments of silence to elapse
before he reacted. He could see that Davis was actually tens-
ing up and Hodgetts could barely keep himself from breaking
out into hysterical laughter, no less keep a simple smirk off
his face.He had known Davis for a long time and this was the
first instance he could actually remember being in a position
to play a serious trick on his good friend and colleague.“Well
you know that the offer is quite tempting,” Hodgetts lightly
remarked.“You keep telling me how I need to diversify my
investments. Perhaps I should give Russ’s proposal earnest
consideration—I could even negotiate for partial ownership
of this new venture!”
Davis, usually the cool, calm, and collected partner, was
turning several lovely shades of red when Hodgetts could no
longer contain himself from bursting out laughing.“Of course
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I'm sorry that I haven't been able to get a hold of you on the phone the last couple of days. I wanted to talk to you
before the letter got to you. However I was unable to reach you. I wanted to take the opportunity to thank you for all
that you have done for my wife and me. I am sorry that our original plan never got to where we wanted it to. I also want-
ed to wish you the best of luck with DHR Construction, LLC. I also wanted to see if you were still interested in guaran-
teeing and providing the 20 percent for the land as was originally discussed for my first project. If you are, I would like
to treat it as a private investment in which I would pay you your original investment plus 2 percent of the total sales
price as was previously agreed upon. If you are unable to do so, I understand completely. I am currently working on a con-
tract that will layout the agreement for the investment. I have sent you a hard copy of a similar letter in which I have
enclosed the corporate credit card and the keys to the houses DHR is building. I mailed them to your office. If you could
please get back to me regarding the properties either via e-mail or by phone, I would greatly appreciate it.
David:
Thanks for keeping me informed as to your plans with your own construction firm and I appreciate your contribution to
starting up DHR. I understand that the mortgage on your house is quite high and that you cannot afford to buy this
home—any suggestions for the disposition of this house to recoup the costs?  
I am honored by your invitation to become involved in your business. What I do not understand is why would you
need these start-up funds in the first place? Davis and I signed an agreement with you that said that we would be
cosigners on your next three projects provided that they started within the next six months. 
Maybe I've been out of the loop and I have missed something—let me know what you think.
David:
You have put me in a very, very awkward position. You gave no indication of problems when you, Stephen, and I met for
breakfast, and signed the breakup contracts so I was extremely surprised when I got the letter from your lawyer want-
ing to renegotiate the deal. I have no idea why you felt you had to go that route to solve problems you had not alerted
Stephen and me to, but it was your choice. Simply, what you have now done is put our relationship in the realm of attor-
neys. All agreements from this point on will have to be done through our attorneys. I have instructed my attorney
regarding our official response to the request for renegotiations and the conditions that will best serve DHR
Construction, LLC, and will await a response from your attorney. I hope we can come to a final agreement very quickly.
Regarding further investments or guarantees for your new real estate business from me, based on the events of
this last week, I am surprised you would even ask. I continue to wish you the best of fortunes and I sincerely hope you
will be successful, as I have said all along. Exactly what my help to you could/should be at this point deserves some very
careful consideration, which I will do.
Hodgetts immediately replied to the e-mail, blind copying Davis.
Davis also responded to Russ’s e-mail and blind copied Hodgetts. He took a very different approach:
Simultaneously, Richard Davis received a similar e-mail:
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I’m playing with him! How could I not follow this to its most
illogical conclusion? Our new book which I have just out-
lined, The English Professor Turns Capitalist, states that a
moral capitalist allows all irrational behavior to be treated as
humanely and kindly as possible—Russ has built his castle in
the sky, why shouldn’t I let him live in it for awhile? I’m just
wondering how far I can carry on this farce until he realizes
that I’m not serious.
I must admit that I read his e-mail with real amusement.He
must know that any information that he sends me I will share
with you and vice versa. Unless, of course, he wants you to
know that he’s made me an offer. Does he think he can drive
a wedge between you and me? Secondly, does he actually
think that I would fund a competitive startup venture to 
DHR Construction?”
Davis poured himself another brandy as he pondered the
situation.“Russ must be in serious trouble to ask us both, inde-
pendently, for assistance. I thought he may have found another
investor to shore him up and that’s why he decided to renege
on our contract. Apparently not. He acted before thinking (as
if that’s something new) and he’s starting to realize the conse-
quences.He’s now scrambling for an investor if he’s desperate
enough to contact you and me in this way.Frankly, if you and I
refuse to guarantee his loans, he’s probably screwed. He’s still
sending out rumors that I am a bad manager and that on his
own he can build 100 homes a year. The guy needs a very
strong dose of reality. I’ll be interested in his next contact with
you—there will be no contact with me.”
Hodgetts was a bit taken aback by Davis’s last comment
since Russ was a former student and Davis had gone out of
his way to bring Russ into DHR Construction. Hodgetts had
set his brandy down during the entire discussion and finally
took his first sip—he needed to steady himself before he ven-
tured into his next line of commentary.“I think that Russ is
waiting to see what you and I will do in terms of his offer and
perhaps hopes to play us off against each other. I’m curious
if he’ll come back to me with a counter offer, or if he’ll con-
tact us through his lawyer again.
I must admit, however, that I am tired of these games.We
need to take positive actions now that we have permanently
and forever severed our ties with Russ.” A few more sips of
brandy and Hodgetts fell back into his old habit of quoting
the great bard,William Shakespeare:
When we mean to build, we first survey the plot, then
draw the model; and when we see the figure of the house,
then must we rate the cost of the erection.13 But O, what
men dare do! What men may do! What men daily do, not
knowing what they do!14
What’s gone and what’s past help should be past grief 15
for to mourn a mischief that is past and gone is the next
way to draw new mischief on.16 Yet a crafty knave does
need no broker17 for time shall unfold what his plaited cun-
ning hides.18 Come what come may, time and the hour
runs through the roughest day.19 What else seest thou
Richard in the dark backward and abysm of time?”20
Davis, who would normally respond to Hodgetts’ play act-
ing through the persona of the great detective, Sherlock
Holmes, decided to quote from Scott Adams’ beloved cartoon
Dilbert. “Stephen, I can please only one person per day.
Today is not your day.Tomorrow isn’t looking good either.21
What I need from you now is a list of specific unknown prob-
lems that we will encounter.22 Intelligence, as you might have
guessed, has much less practical application to our problem
than you’d think.”23
Both Hodgetts and Davis chuckled at Davis’s acerbic
response. Their pedantic play seemed more like the Bud
Abbott and Lou Costello routine “Who’s on first?” than a
serious conversation. Both knew that they had a real prob-
lem on their hands that neither one really wanted to deal
with. It wasn’t a matter of who was on first but “what do we
do now?”
Editors’ Note: Anyone wishing to obtain the instructor’s man-




1 The names of the companies and individuals in the case have been changed as per the owners’ requests.
2 http://www.bcpl.net/~lmoskowi/HolmesQuotes/q.creed.html, March 23, 2004.
3 We would like to thank the reviewer for indicating the need to discuss Stephen Hodgetts’, Richard and Adrienne Davis’s man-
agerial experiences with their rental business as well as David Russ’s previous work experience.
4 Dingee,A. L. M., B. Haslett, and L. E. Smollen. 2002. Characteristics of a successful entrepreneurial management team. In R.W.
Price (ed.) Annual Editions: Entrepreneurship 02/03. Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Duskin, 100–104.
5 We are indebted to the reviewers for their observations and comments.
6 Most construction loans were based on a percentage of construction costs, not assessed value, and therefore required at least
20 percent out-of-pocket expenses for the builder excluding land costs.
7 http://www.bcpl.net/~lmoskowi/HolmesQuotes/q.Watson.html, October 13, 2003.
8 http://www.bcpl.net/~lmoskowi/HolmesQuotes/q.detection.html, October 13, 2003.
9 http://absoluteshakespeare.com/trivia/quotes/quotes.htm, October 14, 2003.
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13 http://www.bartleby.com/100/138.18.html, November 19, 2003.
14 http://www.allshakespeare.com/quotes.php?id=336, November 19, 2003.
15 http://www.allshakespeare.com/quotes.php?id=344, November 19, 2003.
16 http://absoluteshakespeare.com/trivia/quotes/quotes.htm, November 19, 2003.
17 http://www.fool.com/specials/2000/sp000401.htm, November 19, 2003.
18 http://www.bartleby.com/100/138.33.html, November 19, 2003.
19 http://www.bartleby.com/100/138.31.html, November 19, 2003.
20 http://www.bartleby.com/100/138.1.html, November 19, 2003.
21 http://users2.ev1.net/~fkubat/sayings/b/sayb56.htm, November 19, 2003.
22 http://www.qis.net/~jimjr/work86.htm, November 19, 2003.
23 http://users2.ev1.net/~fkubat/sayings/b/sayb56.htm, November 19, 2003.
44 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
About the Authors
HERBERT SHERMAN (Herbert.Sherman@liu.edu) is a professor of management and program coordinator of
the business and accounting program at Southampton College–Long Island University (New York). He
received his Ph.D. in strategic management from the Union Institute and University in Cincinnati, Ohio. Dr.
Sherman teaches undergraduate and graduate courses in management and marketing strategy. His research
interests include business strategy, case writing and research, and education administration. He has published
his work in several journals, including Journal of Management Science and Policy Analysis,
Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, Case Research Journal, Management Decisions, and
Planning for Higher Education. Dr. Sherman recently coauthored a book entitled Supervision in Colleges
and Universities (University Press, 2004) and is completing a coauthored textbook in strategic management
with the same coauthor. He is the currently editor of the Case Journal and the former editor of the Journal
of Behavioral and Applied Management.
DANIEL JAMES ROWLEY (daniel.rowley@unco.edu) is a professor of management and chair of the
Management Department at the Monfort College of Business at the University of Northern Colorado. He is the
lead author of four scholarly books on strategic planning in colleges and universities; a workbook in the same
series; a book on academic supervision; and a forthcoming textbook on business strategic management with
Dr. Sherman. He is the author of articles and presentations on these subjects nationally and internationally. He
has served as editor and as associate editor of the Journal of Behavioral and Applied Management, and has
published book reviews and article reviews in several different journals. He received his B.A. from the
University of Colorado at Boulder in 1969; his MPA from the University of Denver in 1978; and his Ph.D. from
the University of Colorado at Boulder in 1987.
44
New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Vol. 7 [2004], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje/vol7/iss2/1
It was reported that on a Nova Scotia fishing trip many years
ago, Ted Williams, the Boston Red Sox star hitter, and Sam
Snead, the standout golfer of his era, entered into a conversa-
tion concerning the relative difficulty of their two sports. It
went something like this:
Teddy Ballgame:“Sam,golf is easy.The ball just sits there
on the ground.When you’re good and ready, you hit it! In
baseball, I face a pitcher slinging the blurry white pill at 95
miles-per-hour! And I don’t get any second-chance
Mulligans like you golfers!”
Slamming Sammy responded:“Ted, every time you hit a
foul ball, you are really getting a Mulligan! You get to hit
the next pitch. In golf, we have to hit our foul balls from
wherever they’ve landed!”
While I’ve personally attained certain levels of incompe-
tence in both sports, I know from my entrepreneurial activ-
ities that we can draw two object lessons from this classic
conversation. First, it is generally moot to compare one par-
ticular challenging venture directly to another; a single dis-
similarity can outweigh all points of commonality. Second,
unless you cheat or passively await divine intervention, there
are no Mulligans in entrepreneurship to help you succeed.
You should intend, therefore, to meet the rigors of concep-
tualizing, implementing and operating your new business
venture without the benefit of “a free pass”. In this Age of
Entitlement—a term coined by Robert J. Samuelson
(1996)—increasing numbers of people seek the easy path.
There are few entitlements, however, for small business, and
the entrepreneur should look in the mirror for self-help.
Entrepreneurship requires serious, well-focused endeavors
and an enormous amount of blood, sweat and tears! Good
decision-making entails all that effort—plus unbiased and
intelligent sorting of alternate actions.
The statistics of success in decision-making suggest that
entrepreneurs face daunting odds. In the chaotic world of
venturing, you are expected to be near perfect. You must
succeed at each step of the business development journey.
Ted Williams, by contrast, failed to get a hit more than 6
times out of 10.At each hole, Sam Snead generally needed 3
to 5 shots to get the ball in the cup. Sports metaphors
undoubtedly trivialize the plight of the would-be entrepre-
neur. In striving to be near perfect, entrepreneurs confront a
series of complex tasks: planning, product/service develop-
ment, marketing, financing, operations/organization build-
ing, and sales.
The road map for a new venture can be depicted by a
complicated, occasionally impressive, decision tree that
sequences these tasks in a cascade of branching actions
and outcomes (Ulvila and Brown 1982). The underlying
logic, thankfully, can be simplified. If the conditional prob-
ability (i.e., conditional upon the previous venture stages
being successful) of each of these six stages is a
respectable 80 percent, the probability of success is only
26 percent (0.86)! Not good enough for many early-stage
investors. Improving each of the conditional probabilities
to 90 percent produces a 53 percent probability of suc-
cess.You’ll still fail half the time! Success and bad decisions
obviously don’t mix well!
Dilemmas Influencing Decision-Making
When we analyze how small business CEOs make choices, we
are reminded that in the hierarchy of decision influences, sur-
vival heads the list. Staying alive, however, cannot be taken for
granted. Risk abounds. Small business continues, nevertheless,
as an important subset of a dynamic economy.
Small and emerging companies contribute both job cre-
ation importance and volatility to our economy. The Wall
Street Journal (Bounds 2004) recently culled some data from
the Small Business Administration that underscore the extent
to which small firms permeate, if not dominate, the U.S.econ-
omy.
Small businesses:
 employ half of all private sector employees;
 generate 60–80 percent of all new jobs annually; and
 pay 44.3 percent of total U.S. private payroll.
Life cycles of business births and deaths in 2003:
 business births—572,900
Joseph E. Levangie
S ome of the best entrepreneurs fail early and often.Less talented or less committed entrepreneurs do noteven get a second chance.Failure and setbacks, how-
ever, can be instructive.What lessons can be learned from
these experiences? How can the entrepreneur (and
investors) navigate around the potholes on the New
Venture Highway? Read on.
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 terminations—554,800
 bankruptcies—35,037 
The real dilemmas an entrepreneur faces in decision-mak-
ing—which can ultimately threaten his survival—involve all
the usual factors: external factors beyond the firm’s control;
competition; financing difficulties; operational problems;per-
sonal problems of the entrepreneur; and calamities, including
fraud, natural disasters and theft.
External Factors
The entrepreneur has little control over external factors. His
(or her) decisions should be crafted, however, with an
informed sensitivity to the company’s changing environ-
ment.A few years ago, when the dot.com bubble burst, thou-
sands of development stage companies were swept under in
its wake. Dozens of New England companies canceled or
postponed their IPOs. Many entrepreneur-investors took a
severe financial “haircut,” laid off people, closed operations,
watched loans go bad and, at not an insignificant cost,
acquired new-born humility. Diminution of personal net
worth aside, the rigors of an economic downturn can intro-
duce much needed discipline to the entrepreneur.The dilem-
ma of a nasty business climate has, ironically, reintroduced
old basic concepts such as “bootstrapping” and “moonlight-
ing” (Denison 2000) to venture decision-making. The harsh
reality requires the entrepreneur to squeeze incremental
value out of scarce available resources. This renewed disci-
pline serves well to remind CEOs that the crazed days of
investors throwing funds at deals is history; that party is over
and it’s time to sober up!
In addition to the vicissitudes of the economy, there are
other external decision-making challenges for the CEO
imposed by new regulations.An important regulatory exam-
ple is the ever-present Sarbanes-Oxley (S-Ox) with its
requirements for improved corporate governance. Berry
(2004) reports that while presently only public companies
need comply with S-Ox regulations, it is possible that some
offshoot of S-Ox will ultimately apply to privately-held firms
as well as not-for-profits.The real decision tree for the entre-
preneur is whether to become S-Ox compliant now, or wait
until the rule extension is imposed; and how to craft an exit
position for investors—be it an IPO or a buy-out by a publicly
held company. In either case S-Ox compliance will be neces-
sary. Still, I find many entrepreneurs staunchly resisting S-Ox
under the guise that compliance is expensive and they’re sav-
ing money. It is like the old Fram oil filter commercial—“You
can pay me now or you can pay me later!”
Competitive Factors
An enlightening acid test to see if an entrepreneur really
knows his business is to ask,“How do you rate your compe-
tition?” Having interviewed well in excess of a thousand
entrepreneurs over three decades, I would assess—anecdo-
tally—that a full third of these would-be captains of industry
give a knee-jerk response of “Oh, we really don’t have any
competition!” Wrong answer! The essential dilemma is that
the company’s strategic decisions cannot be made in a com-
petitive vacuum.
If one learns nothing else in an MBA program, one should
remember to address strategic issues by employing the ven-
erable notion of SWOT—Strengths, Weaknesses,
Opportunities & Threats. CFO Magazine reports (Durfee
2004) that the typical reaction for CEOs is to use half of
SWOT—to focus on the positives of the external business
environment and to deemphasize the negatives. When bad
things happen to these good entrepreneurs—say the flop of
a new product launch—it is not credible for them to blame
“bad luck” if the risks of competitive threats have not been
considered.The better you analyze critical decisions, the bet-
ter your “luck!”
Over the last 25 years, the reigning guru of competitive
analysis has been Michael Porter of the Harvard Business
School, supplanting the Boston Consulting Group with its
“experience curve”(“profitability is directly related to market
share”), so ballyhooed in the ‘60s and ‘70s. Warsh (1994)
reports that Porter imputes four competitive forces impact-
ing the profitability of an industry:
1. rivalry among existing firms;
2. the bargaining power of both buyers and suppliers;
3. the threat of new entrants to the business; and
4. the threat of potential substitute products.
Porter introduced the “value chain” framework of interre-
lated marketing functions (customer base, brand name, distri-
bution, service).The value chain contributes to the strength
of a firm’s product presence and calls attention to the com-
petitive advantages that many big companies enjoy.
Entrepreneurs, who often view big firms as outmoded
dinosaurs, need to assess realistically the competitive risk of
all market participants in the marketplace—including large
firms—in the course of strategic decision-making.
How does the enlightened entrepreneur discover more
about the competition? While there are no Mulligans in this
arena, there are ways to improve your odds. Caulfield (2004)
reports that initiating the proper due diligence is key. The
right “course management” involves culling data from the
public domain, overlaying your knowledge about your own
company with that of the industry, and connecting the dots
to draw patterns. Specific steps include:
 Research easily accessible databases to determine com-
petitors’ health.
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 Check competitors’ Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) quarterly and annual filings at
www.sec.gov to find product line margins, customer
base, research spending, and personnel background.
 Check competitors’ credit with Dun & Bradstreet,
which will sell you detailed reports for $122 each.
 Creatively dig up important competitor information.
 Attend professional courses taught by competitors’
management which might reveal their private finan-
cial and marketing information.
 Access competitors’presentations to analysts at invest-
ment conferences and on conference calls which
might represent the informational mother lode (e.g., I
once plugged into the conference call of my biggest
competitor, asked a question, and obtained an answer
that swayed a critical strategic decision of our emerg-
ing company!).
 Check the Help Wanted pages to see if competitors
are hiring; and if so, what kind of technical skills they
are seeking.
 Analyze your foes’web sites.Email some queries to the
web master—who knows, maybe he will spill the
beans on something important and proprietary!
 On the defense, assume that turnabout is fair play.
 Be careful to screen all your company’s web site post-
ings, press releases, presentations and vendor discus-
sions.
 Compartmentalize information among your compa-
ny’s different departments.Apple Computer, for exam-
ple, can trace internal leaks because it assigns differ-
ent code names to different departments for the same
development project.
 As appropriate, if threatened by overseas rip-off com-
panies, have some fun. If your company needs to file a
patent (that works), file several others that do not
work and have the foreign firms waste their reverse
engineering budget chasing a red herring!
Financing Factors
The area of finance is where the aspiring entrepreneur gen-
erally has the biggest dilemma in decision-making. Issues
abound.
 How much capital do we need? When do we run out?
 What kind of capital should we seek with what struc-
ture?
 Where do we find the investors?
 How much will it cost our ownership in terms of dilu-
tion and control?
 What is involved in negotiations?
 How do we close the deal?
A cute ode by DeGarmo (1991) regarding an entrepre-
neur’s quest for funding reflects well the financial decision-
making climate:
We were hungry for money, our nerves were all frayed.
To survive, our expenses could NOT be delayed.
In the past our agreements on handshakes were made.
We just did not know how this new game was played
As we battled each crisis of mistimed receipts
We bluffed, we negotiated, made impassioned entreats.
The nights we spent tossing and whipping the sheets.
The days were reserved for strategic retreats.
Now we’re losing our stakes, being left with the rinds,
From those equity penalties we shouldn’t have signed.
We brushed off our lawyers.We were caught in a bind,
By those last-minute threats: “We’re changing our
minds.”
In late 2004, there is good news and bad news for entre-
preneurs as they consider capital raise-ups.The bad news is
that while venture capitalists invested $833 million in 74
deals in New England companies in the second quarter of
2004, according to an Ernst & Young report (Witkowski
2004), only 32 percent of the deals involved seed or first
round financings. The remainder went to bolster existing
portfolio companies.The good news is that venture capital is
not the only source of funds. Gennari (2004) reports that of
Inc. Magazine’s 2003 list of the 500 fastest-growing compa-
nies, only 2 percent used venture capital as their source for
start-up funding,and more than 70 percent were started with
$100K or less. Healy (2004) reports that private investor
groups, such as the Lexington, Massachusetts, Common
Angels, are dramatically increasing their deal review activi-
ties.The dilemma for entrepreneurs is how to tap in on these
positive developments.
Operational Factors
Peter Drucker (2004) has consulted to business for 65 years.
His recent writings address several aspects of the operational
dilemma of decision-making.Drucker concludes that success-
ful managers can be “charismatic or dull, generous or num-
bers oriented.” But every effective executive followed eight
simple practices:
1.They asked,“What needs to be done?”
2.They asked,“What is right for the enterprise?”
3.They developed action plans.
4.They took responsibility for decisions.
5.They took responsibility for communicating.
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6. They were focused on opportunities rather than prob-
lems.
7. They ran productive meetings.
8. They thought and said “we” rather than “I.”
Drucker explains, “The first two practices gave them the
knowledge they needed.The next four helped them convert
this knowledge into effective action.The last two ensured that
the whole organization felt responsible and accountable.”
Entrepreneurs who remain blind to this kind of invaluable
advice are far more likely to make decision errors.
Personal Factors
Among the unfavorable traits you might find in an entrepre-





 lack of relationship-building; and
 emotional immaturity.
As chronicled in the article “The Young and the Clueless”
(Bunker et al. 2002), such negative personal characteristics
outweigh, in case after case, the benefits of being high-ener-
gy, intelligent and aggressively hard-working. I regrettably
have my own war stories of unfortunate personal traits in
entrepreneurs confounding otherwise normal decision-mak-
ing:
 A London investment banker looked over at our techni-
cal founder/CEO and quietly asked me if his secretary
might not take our “boy entrepreneur out shopping so
the rest of us can complete the financing.”
 A cofounder and CEO in one of our technology compa-
nies was so emotionally committed to the company’s
original target market that he could not concur with the
board of directors’ decision to change direction and tar-
get a larger,more quickly accessible, faster growing,high-
er margin market. Despite being a large shareholder, he
defamed the company to Wall Street, and started to spiral
emotionally out of control. With an armed guard on
premises, the board of directors voted him out of the
company.Thankfully, no shots were fired! This entrepre-
neur’s self-destructive decision-making remains, howev-
er, a dilemma to many of us, years later.
Calamities, Fraud and Other Surprise Factors
A question for the ages: If fortunes are destined to go really
bad for your company, would you rather mess up on your
own or have it “done to you?” This dilemma is not really a
binary decision since the choice for some entrepreneurs
depends on whether the calamity is an act of God (e.g., a
flood) or an act of man (e.g., fraud). Some of us can—reluc-
tantly—accept outcomes beyond our control (e.g., the
dot.com market bubble burst) far easier than fraud by a trust-
ed member of the entrepreneurial team:
 The CEO of a firm we were acquiring dropped dead only 20
minutes before signatures on the closing documents were
to be obtained, thereby aborting the deal (sad,but the kind
of busted deal which we can understand and accept).
 The CEO of a newly public development-stage company
that we helped sponsor took a two-month post-IPO vaca-
tion to Australia on company funds to improve his tennis
game after his eight-year struggle to raise funds (fraudu-
lent and unacceptable,of course, leading to his dismissal,
and forfeiture of his 40% equity interest).
Watkins and Bazerman (2003) suggest that signals of future
calamities generally lie all around us and it is up to us to be
astute enough to recognize them.Truly out-of-the-blue surpris-
es aside, these researchers employ a concept called the “RPM
process”: recognition, prioritization, and mobilization.
 Recognition
 Marshal resources to scan the environment for emerg-
ing threats.
 Analyze and interpret the data.
 Prioritization
 Brainstorm the possible surprises.
 Analyze the cost-benefit of such consequences.
 Prioritize those threats with the highest costs.
 Mobilization
 Select the most serious threats.
 Take precautionary measures commensurate with
risks.
The Entrepreneurial Decision-maker
I have always found it fascinating to observe how business
decisions are made. Large corporations—to their CYA cred-
it—need to get consultants on board,purchase pricey market
research reports, and conduct a seemingly endless chain of
meetings. Some sessions may even be held off-site to stimu-
late the (presumptive) latent, lateral-thinking juices of the
management team.Only then can they line up “the right play-
ers” to deliver “the big green light” of approval. Time is not
usually deemed as critical; in fact, the time needed for a deci-
sion tends to be an exponential function of the number of
people involved.A sidebar to this contorted decision route is
the university setting where some schools actually flaunt
their “committee on committees”as a desirable level of facul-
ty involvement in the decision-making process.
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In contrast, on dozens of occasions I have witnessed an
entrepreneur take less than 90 seconds to make a monumen-
tal decision. Often while eating, and dripping pizza slime
over an original document for his signature, he will ask a few
key questions and say aye or nay. The ramifications of his
instant decision might impact 150 percent of the company’s
cash balance or 30 percentage points in the venture’s proba-
bility of success.“No matter,”says the entrepreneur,“time is of
the essence!” He continues eating.
This dichotomy of decision-making approaches under-
scores a certain conundrum: Can a professional manager
become an entrepreneur or can an entrepreneur act like a
manager? As O’Neal (1993) reports, even the venerable Peter
Drucker skirted this issue in his writings on the subject by
disclaiming that he would not discuss “psychology and char-
acter traits” of entrepreneurs. O’Neal notes, “While
[Drucker’s] probably right that the nuts and bolts of entre-
preneurship can be studied and learned, the soul of an entre-
preneur is something else altogether.”
Amen, amen. So it comes to pass I will take a stab at deci-
phering this quandary of the entrepreneurial soul. Some
observers of the scene, of course, believe that certain entre-
preneurs whom they’ve encountered are, in fact, soul-less!
The issue facing business schools, for example, is that the
principles and mechanics of entrepreneurship can be taught,
but the notions of creativity,drive and appetite for risk-taking
remain well below the surface.
Prospective entrepreneurs come in all colors, sizes and
shapes. Few are obvious daredevils or snake oil salespeople.
Not many are impulsive or flamboyant. Most have an entre-
preneurial idea and an intense need to exploit that idea “their
way.” O’Neal (1993) reports on a Purdue University study on
why entrepreneurs “take the plunge.” Based on 2,995 people
who had decided to go into business for themselves, they
responded “very important” to the following reasons
(approximate percentage responses):
 to use my skills/ability 56%
 to gain control over my life 54%
 to build for the family. 52%
 to pursue the challenge 48%
 to live how/where I like 32%
 to gain respect/recognition 19%
 to earn lots of money 18%
 to fulfill other’s expectations 9%
 to follow the best alternative available 7%
One can interpret this underlying motivation for the entre-
preneurship life in the framework of decision-making traits,
quirks and weaknesses by addressing the following:
 Does the stage of business life impact how decisions are
made?
 How do personality and power/control issues impact
choices?
 What type of bias creeps into decisions? 
 What is the consequence of the decision-making
methodology?
Stages of One’s Decision-Making Life
Bennis (2004) references Shakespeare’s seven ages of man
(As You Like It) with a remarkable combination of business
and literary acumen. Paraphrasing the Avon bard, Bennis
applies the following seven stages to the development of
leadership, and, derivatively, decision-making:
1.The “infant executive” needs a mentor before he’s even
given the leadership job. He must recruit a real team to
back him up. His decision mistakes are typically from
inexperience.
2.“The schoolboy, with shining face” as a first-time leader,
is potentially unnerved by the spotlight and scrutiny
surrounding his initial words and actions.He senses that
he has only one chance to make a first impression. New
team members will show either trust or distrust, either
support or resistance—yet some of the negative feed-
back on his decisions may actually be accurate. His
errors in decision-making may stem from nervously
looking over his shoulder.
3.“The lover, with a woeful ballad” experiences the dilem-
mas of setting new boundaries in leading his former col-
leagues. Evaluation of his team’s job performance, strat-
egy formulation, and task prioritization can be in poten-
tial conflict with his “loving” relationships with his old
cronies.His decision errors often emanate from the con-
fusion of changing relationships.
4.“The bearded soldier” becomes comfortable with his
leadership position.A danger evolves that he may forget
the visceral impact of his words and decisions on his
staff. As a result, his team may only tell him what they
think he wants to hear.The true leader avoids this com-
munications barrier by being open with his people. He
may decide to hire talent better than himself and praise
them for their accomplishments, rather than being jeal-
ous at their stars glowing perhaps brighter than his.
Conversely, the degree to which the entrepreneur might
have any self-doubt about his own shortcomings can
create a nonrational (and possibly an irrational) deci-
sion-making environment.
5.“The general, full of wise saws” becomes arrogant and
does not see or hear the dangers around him. Like
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, he does not heed the sooth-
sayer’s Ides of March warning or Calpurnia’s pleas.
Arrogance can keep the “general” from building
alliances and coalitions in his senior team that will pro-
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vide him with valuable input and the “reality check” he
needs for his difficult decision-making.He lectures a lot,
listens little.
6.“The statesman, with spectacles on nose” is in a position
to pass on his wisdom without worries of personal
ambition. For short periods of time, the statesman can
be quite effective in making important and difficult
decisions without personal career considerations.
7.“The sage, second childishness” is the older mentor who
wants to create a legacy by imparting knowledge to a
younger generation of entrepreneurs and to provide
structure for more mature decision-making. The sage
reminisces, orates and teaches.
One of my all-time favorite business shrinks, Abraham
Zaleznik (1967), penned the following, back when I was a
mere youth in his first-year HBS class:
One of the major contributions of psychoanalytic psychology has
been to demonstrate the place of conflict in the development of
the individual. Each stage in the life cycle involves personal con-
flict because the individual has the task of giving up one set of
gratifications and searching for alternatives that take account
simultaneously of biological, psychological, and social chal-
lenges. Failure to relinquish gratifications impedes development,
while overly rapid learning establishes a gap between instinctu-
al-emotional processes, on the one hand, and cognitive-rational
capacities, on the other. This gap leads often to a highly rigid set
of conditions for the exercise of competence.
Whereas I might characterize an egregiously misbehaving
entrepreneur as “a **** jerk,”Dr. Zaleznik would say it with so
much more panache!
Personality and the Need for Power
Whenever I meet an entrepreneur for the first time, I know
that there’s a 95 percent chance I’ll be encountering a Type-
A personality. He or she will likely be bright, aggressive,
impatient and egocentric. That’s the easy part. Which of
these entrepreneurs will be successful (and why) is more
challenging to assess. Here’s where good and bad decision-
making comes into play. Manfred F. R. Kets de Vries (Coutu
2004) has devoted his life’s work to understanding how
capable, visionary and inspiring executives can, neverthe-
less, make irrational decisions. This has led him into the
fields of psychiatry and psychoanalysis to study the com-
plexities of the business leader. Ket de Vries observes:
“People in mental hospitals are easy to understand because
they suffer from extreme conditions. The mental health of
senior executives is much more subtle—[leaders] are insult-
ed to hear that certain things in their minds are uncon-
scious. But like it or not, people have blind spots, and the
non-rational personality needs of decision makers can seri-
ously affect the management process.”
Another analytical framework involves the laws of the jun-
gle—more specifically, chimpanzees. Dutch primatologist
Frans de Waal (Lesly 1995) has studied chimps and views evo-
lutionary psychology as a useful backdrop for explaining the
subtle jockeying and constant gamesmanship of the work-
place. Chimps demonstrate that the leader cannot allow him-
self to be too aggressive since his lieutenants will then dedi-
cate themselves to finding a way to topple him. Our innate
ape-like aggression may well derive from our inherited gene
pool!
The entrepreneurial animal may extend this pattern of
behavior.Without the counterbalance of investors—through
the board of directors—or trusted advisors, an unbridled
bully entrepreneur can desensitize employees, cause organi-
zational neurosis and induce a chain of nonrational decisions.
The bully personality takes many forms, as reported by Carey
(2004):
 The snake—Jekyll-and-Hyde type who badmouths you
behind your back while smiling to your face
 The screamer—a fist-pounder who exhibits public dis-
plays of bravado, if not real rage
 The nitpicker—an insulter who employs insinuation to
erode the confidence of his underlings
 The gatekeeper—a cold and controlling “god” who plays
favorites, permitting some employees to succeed and
withholding resources from others
Bias
Decision-making is rarely objective.An entrepreneur’s distort-
ed perception of the world often impacts his decision-mak-
ing reality. Bias can be introduced in a number of ways.
Anti-managerial Bias. Kaplan (1987) writes that once
the hero worship surrounding the vogue of entrepreneur-
ship wears off, entrepreneurship may devolve to being
viewed as a cliché by critics in large companies and just
another opportunity for a hustle. In physics, every action has
an equal and opposite reaction. So too it is with entrepre-
neurs. The chasm between entrepreneurs and professional
managers often rivals that of two political parties.The entre-
preneur may view the large corporate manager as stodgy and
overly protective of his backside.A suggestion to an entrepre-
neur that a corporate - type might be innovative or enlight-
ened is deemed as oxymoronic as vegetarian meatloaf.
This entrepreneurial bias can preemptively eliminate any
opportunity for collaboration with big companies. In two dif-
ferent companies, we have had a founder make a knee-jerk
reaction, dismissing out-of-hand the prospect of a strategic
alliance with a Fortune 500 company. In each case, it was a
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terrible decision.A subset of this bias is the anti-MBA bias in
the engineering community. Roberts (1992) suggests,
“Though their attitude is beginning to change, engineers still
regard people in management schools as irrelevant or stereo-
typically crass.”
Metaphorical Bias. We are all guilty of using buzz
phrases from other disciplines as a crutch to communicate
the virtues of our own little venture. We might reference
guerilla marketing (from military science), viral marketing
(from epidemiology) or the Internet bubble (from physics).
I’ve demonstrated earlier (with Mulligans), that we can tap
into a wealth of sports metaphors. As von Ghyczy (2003)
notes, metaphors are a useful complement to business mod-
els:“Metaphors can be good or bad, brilliantly or poorly con-
ceived, imaginative or dreary—but they cannot be true.”We
had one entrepreneur who would not agree to any decision
unless it could be explained in battlefield terms. War com-
parisons, of course, can help in certain aspects of strategy
formulation, but fall short in others—say, customer satisfac-
tion!
The Bias of Optimism. When the entrepreneur sup-
presses pessimistic opinions from his team while rewarding
optimistic ones, the venture team’s ability to think critically
is thereby undermined. Lovallo and Kahneman (2003) com-
ment that while optimism is not a bad trait, it generates more
in the way of moral-boosting enthusiasm than decision-relat-
ed realism.Although optimism enables people to be resilient
in confronting difficult challenges, it is less helpful in con-
tributing to difficult, realistic decision-making involving large
sums of investor money.
Ethical Bias. Some of my best business friends have
acted unethically at one time or another. One entrepreneur
was fined millions of dollars by the federal government for
performing and invoicing the same contracted R&D [Small
Business Innovative Research (SBIR)] work for different fed-
eral agencies. Gellerman (1986) addresses how usually hon-
est, intelligent, compassionate colleagues can act in ways
that are callous, dishonest and wrongheaded. He cites four
rationalizations that have long been used to justify question-
able behavior: “(1) believing that the activity is not ‘really’
illegal or immoral; (2) that it is in the individual’s or the cor-
poration’s best interest; (3) that it will never be found out; or
(4) that because it helps the company the company will con-
done it.”
The old situational ethics issues emerge: How far is too
far? What’s the line between being smart, and being—as the
Brits say—too smart by half? Such ethical bias undermines
decision-making and may introduce considerable downside
risk.
Decision Methodology
The entrepreneur can encounter decision pitfalls in the very
methodology he employs in making decisions. Simple deci-
sions sometimes are not that simple. Decision-making can
succeed or fail based on the logic of the decision structure,
the initialization values used, the kind of financial variables
employed and available information.
Time Sequence. Typically, we think “backwards” in time
to diagnose historic patterns and intuit possible chains of
causation.We think “forward”in time,using variables in math-
ematical formulation, to predict or assess future outcomes.
Einhorn and Hogarth (1987) argue that forward and back-
ward decision-making are interdependent and can be com-
bined to improve decision-making. A simple example:“How
do we get there from here and what are the consequences?”
Targeted future scenarios can be rolled back to influence cur-
rent decision-making.
Anchoring and Adjustment. Entrepreneurs often make
forecasts or estimates for decision-making by starting with a
favorable, easily available reference value and making adjust-
ments to that value. Often the anchor value is either a result
of too much optimism or an oversimplified rule -of-thumb.
The ultimate decision can thereby be skewed by the initial
anchoring value, and may result in unfortunate outcomes
with undue risk.
Framing. A decision is impacted by the way it is struc-
tured, or framed.As Teach (2004) suggests, if a frame is poor-
ly presented, an entrepreneur can unwittingly make an
“unprofitable” decision. An example might be whether to
frame a decision using gross margin (a financial accounting
number) or contribution margin (a cost-accounting number).
Not acknowledging the distinction between fixed and vari-
able costs can sway the decision—say, whether to accept a
contract at a certain price—the wrong way.
Data. Is a little knowledge a dangerous thing? Apparently
not always. Sutcliffe and Weber (2003) contend that the
accuracy of information is less important in decision-making
than the way in which the entrepreneur interprets his com-
petitive environment. If the entrepreneur structures the
decision correctly—with the right time sequence,anchoring
and framing—then the decision analysis should be okay; if
the structure is not correct, perfectly accurate information
won’t save the day.Again, there are no Mulligans in entrepre-
neurship!
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Parting Shots—Do’s and Don’ts
The Don’ts—Where the Snakes in the
Grass Lie
The list of decisions not to make is long enough to fill a shelf
full of business texts. I choose to identify four major areas of
dangerous decision-making.
The Wrong Choice of Business Target. No entrepre-
neurial activity proceeds exactly according to the business
plan.The size of the market can be misjudged, as can the tim-
ing of its maturation. The barriers to market entry can be
underestimated. Competition can be minimized or ignored
completely. In my venturing past, there have been several
companies that initially targeted the wrong market. I dis-
cussed previously the case of the stubborn CEO who was dis-
missed for not redirecting the company in a more profitable
direction.Two successful examples of flexible decision-mak-
ing in start-ups come to mind.
 A solar electric company changed its target from power
generation to power conversion (uninterruptible power
supplies), transforming it from a technological curiosity
to a major corporation that now has revenues over $1
billion and over 6,000 employees.
 A color -matching company was redirected from the den-
tal market to the retail paint market, resulting in prof-
itable sales and a successful IPO on the London Stock
Exchange.
Sometimes the decision to reconsider and reassess the
business concept represents a series of “small correc-
tions” that can add up to a substantial and positive
change. In the case of Il Giornale, an espresso bar,
Szulanski and Winter (2002) report that the founder was
eventually convinced to stop piping in Italian opera,
which customers universally disliked, and to not force
the servers to sport uncomfortable bowties, which
made them grouchy. Was it worth the decision to
change? Upon its renaming, the store morphed into
Starbucks!
The Wrong Decision Regarding People. Back in the
‘70s, I attended a seminar at MIT’s Sloan School that featured
Admiral Hyman Rickover, "father" of our nuclear navy pro-
gram.When asked about the biggest obstacle to success, the
diminutive military man snapped,“People! The moment you
hire your first employee, you have personnel problems!”One
need not be a misanthropic nuclear engineer to be wary of
the “people issue.”
We employ a simple question to bedevil many entrepre-
neurs:“Why did you hire each member of your staff?”While
some of these hot shots provide rationales, others—in the
mode of a cranky three -year -old—whine,“Well, because.…”
Consider how important having a good staff is:
 For years, the mantra in the Boston venture capital com-
munity has been that deals are more successful if one has
a grade B idea with grade A people than a grade A idea
with grade B people.The logic is that the entrepreneur-
ial environment is highly dynamic, and flexibility in
strategic decision-making is required (witness the previ-
ously cited cases where the company’s target market was
redirected).This means no relatives or high school bud-
dies are brought on board unless they would have been
hired from their resumes, references and interviews.
Same thing for the (occasional) “idiot sons” of angel
investors; you take in funds for the merits of your ven-
ture, not for executive baby-sitting! I’ve walked from
countless deals when I see that the company has a num-
ber of clueless hangers-on who are there because of “spe-
cial circumstances.”As the popular phrase goes, the clue
train stops regularly and these folks simply don’t take
delivery!
 When early-stage funds are obtained for a venture, some
founders tend to overhire staff, perhaps to off-load some
of the workload or, in some cases, to serve as palpable
testimony to their success-to-date. While, in principle,
labor is a variable cost—the reality is that added payroll
becomes an integral part of the monthly “nut” that must
be covered by revenues, vendors (accounts payable) or
investors (cash). Further, as benefits are added to attract
the best and the brightest talent, overhead expenses can
escalate. Stires (2004) reports that in the critical area of
medical insurance, the average annual premium per indi-
vidual, paid by employers, is projected to increase from
$9,608 in 2003 to $14,565 in 2006. Bad decisions in per-
sonnel have costly repercussions.
 The shelf life of the individual entrepreneur must be
monitored carefully for on-going viability.There is a con-
cept of “entrepreneurial nostalgia” that might be
observed. Many company founders have difficulty cop-
ing with the steady-state calmness of a smoothly run-
ning operation. They crave that old-time adrenaline
surge associated with survival and crisis management.
They try to recapture past feelings of being really need-
ed—a big boost to their ego affirmation. On one occa-
sion, I monitored my own shelf life and decided that I
was sufficiently bored with the calmness of success in a
company that I cofounded. I made a personnel decision:
I “fired”myself! On that deal,my entrepreneurial warran-
ty had expired!
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Self-Destructive Decisions in Financial Dynamics. I am
a devout believer in modeling the financial dynamics of an
enterprise on a regular basis. The very act of building the
financial model forces the entrepreneur to think through in
detail the key elements of the operation in an integrated
manner. Many entrepreneurs will agree with me up to this
point. They demur, however, when it comes to justifying
input data (e.g.,purchase orders/letters of intent for sales,bill
of materials for cost of goods sold,payroll for labor costs, and
so on) and testing the validity of key assumptions. I believe
strongly that most critical decisions can be assessed a priori
on a “what if”basis.The resistance to this desirable discipline
in decision-making evolves from several rationales:
 The information is not available.
 The information is not “knowable” (a Donald Rumsfeld-
esque term-of-art).
 “We’re not a big company, and I don’t have time to waste
on these fantasy exercises just to make the board of
directors and investors happy!.
 “I don’t understand!”
Without such analytical discipline to support entrepre-
neurial decision-making, important errors can crop up.
 The ramp-up of sales can be overstated.
 The cost of goods sold can be incomplete and therefore
understated (gross margins are thereby inflated).
 The build-up in personnel cannot be justified by the lev-
els of revenues and gross profit.
 Expense pools can build up too fast.
 Cash flows are less well assessed, diminishing the accu-
racy of capital planning.
 Less contingency planning occurs.
Given that there are no Mulligans in entrepreneurial deci-
sion-making, studying the venture’s financial dynamics with
an integrated model is a unique opportunity to make “mis-
takes” merely on paper, without suffering the cash conse-
quences of real-world decision errors.
Ongoing Errors in Strategic Decision-making. Don’t
target a market that is too small for your mission, your oper-
ational infrastructure or your investors’ expectations.
Don’t Overly Focus on One Product, Particularly as
the Company Becomes Robust and Profitable. The only
direction a successful one-product operation takes is towards
lower market share, lower prices and eroded margins. An
example is Sharper Image. Lee (2004) reports that the com-
pany’s Ionic Breeze air purifier represents 40 to 50 percent
of company revenues, and the cheaper knock-offs from
Brookstone and others have slowed Sharper Image’s sales
and slashed its profits.
Don’t Forget to Bootstrap Activities Whenever Pos-
sible. Conservation of cash is a golden rule.
 Virtual CFOs and accountants can be hired on a part-time
basis to minimize staff expense while assuring proper
reporting to investors and banks.
 Outsourcing is now so popular that venture capitalists
routinely ask,“What’s your India plan?”
Don’t Leave the Company Open to Fraud. We don’t
want people spending the precious resources of the compa-
ny on themselves! We don’t want counterfeiting of company
checks or the fraudulent issuance of checks to nonexistent
employees or vendors. Wolf and Company (2004) reports
that 1.2 million worthless checks enter the banking system
each day, and only about 13 percent of check fraud losses are
ever recovered. It is recommended that you:
 Use secure check stock (treated inks, safety papers).
 Maintain tight security over the check stock.
 Reconcile bank statements and report any losses imme-
diately.
 Conduct periodic audits.
Don’t Forget to Protect Proprietary Assets and Intel-
lectual Capital. Expensive patents are not necessarily the
answer—ideas, know-how and processes can and should be
secured inexpensively.A corollary of this is to assure that retir-
ing baby boomers are debriefed to retain the critical informa-
tion they have accumulated over the years. Zarrabian (2004)
reports that in 2005 there will be a staggering 39.7 million
Americans between 55 and 69 years old.Their skill and knowl-
edge is valuable beyond numbers! Don’t decide to let these sea-
soned pros leave the company without extensive debriefing.
Don’t Get the Wrong Investors or Wrong Partners
Involved with the Enterprise. I once spent the better part
of the first year in one venture unraveling—from my position
as board member—a situation where the smallest investor
was the crankiest, and the two company principals were
incompatible. The company survives, but the dysfunctional
staggering-and-reeling that these problems caused out of the
starting gate has extracted a significant price.
The Do’s—How to Operate Smarter and
Make Better Decisions
Keep Your Administrative Housekeeping in Order.
This discipline will save you time at critical junctures in
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decision-making when you want to focus on the merits of
the business issue, not on how to find a missing piece of
paper. The biggest administrative housekeeping chore, of
course, is to implement compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley
regulations.
Perform Due Diligence! If there’s one area that approx-
imates a Mulligan, it is due diligence. The Chinese fortune
cookie reads:“A peek is worth a thousand finesses!”In ventur-
ing, an intelligent peek represents both good offense and
good defense.As discussed earlier, there are ways to unearth
important data on competitors. For potential merger and
acquisition deals, due diligence is critical. Rosenberg (1996)
reports that fully 10 percent of M&A deals are cancelled
because of what is found in due diligence. In an additional 25
percent of the cases, the due diligence findings either cause
the deal to be altered or help the acquirer to negotiate a bet-
ter price. Similarly, due diligence may uncover facts about a
prospective executive hire that red lights certain factors.One
company found out through investigators that the leading
candidate for CEO was more than $100K in arrears in child
support payments! The situation was eventually resolved, but
the company made a more informed decision with the help
of due diligence.
Attract the Right Type of People. The entrepreneur
wants to make people decisions that result in a confident,
resilient organization:
 Harvard’s Kanter (2004) defines confidence as “the
sweet spot between arrogance and despair.Arrogance is
the failure to see any flaws; despair is the failure to
acknowledge any strengths.”
 Regarding resilience, Coutu (2002) notes that more than
education, experience or training, an individual’s level of
resilience will determine who succeeds and who fails.
This is true in the Olympics, the cancer ward and the
boardroom. Resilient people possess three characteris-
tics: a staunch sense of reality, a deep conviction that life
is meaningful, and a remarkable capacity to improvise.
Provide Praise. Rath and Clifton (2004) surveyed—
through Gallup—more than 4 million employees and found
that:
 Negative employees can scare off customers.
 Praise is an important leadership trait, helping to diffuse
whining, unappreciated staffers.
 Praise increases productivity,and praised employees gen-
erate higher loyalty and satisfaction scores from cus-
tomers. The results are better safety records and fewer
accidents on the job.
Always be Customer-sensitive.
 Revenue is the best way to fund the company.
 Customer -related decision-making is bolstered by data
mining, or business intelligence. Example # 1: A retail
mart decides to retain slow-moving French cheeses
because the informational tracking system tells them
that those people who do buy these overpriced cheeses
are the mart’s best customers. Example # 2: A pub can
use software to assess the impact that “happy hour”
offers have on daily sales. If discounting a particular
drink increases sales one day, that can be repeated.
Business intelligence provides the capacity to track
inventory accurately and reprice offerings dynamically.
Try to Be Creative. To cite an example:As a board mem-
ber of a business I cofounded, I became involved in a negoti-
ation with a large company that wanted to invest in our
emerging (publicly-traded) company so that we could further
our product development. Rather than have them become a
shareholder, I convinced all parties that the same ends could
be met by having the funds enter our company as contract-
ed R&D revenue—which on our part we could report as
sales with modest profits, not as a total R&D expense write-
off. The funding company could recoup its investment
through product royalties—for them, a much more straight-
forward exit position than equity. It was a win-win scenario
that rewarded creative decision-making.
Parting Shots
Building upon my opening sports metaphor, the opportunity
for success involves keeping it close on the back nine (golf)
and being within a run or two in the seventh inning (base-
ball). In the end, success generally occurs when everything is
on the line. In the game of entrepreneurship, good decisions,
with informed board of directors' oversight, are vital to com-
pany success. In this age of corporate governance, I can sum-
marize my observations on entrepreneurial decision-making
with 10 questions that a diligent director of the company
should ask. Compiled by Charan and Schlosser (2003), these
questions underscore how good entrepreneurs can and
should be directed to make good decisions.
1. How does the company make money?
2.Are customers paying up?
3.What could really hurt—or kill—the company in the
next few years?
4. How are we doing relative to our competitors?
5. If the CEO were hit by a bus tomorrow, who could run
this company?
6. How are we going to grow?
7.Are we living within our means?
8. How much does the CEO get paid?
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9. How does bad news get to the top?
10. Do I understand the answers to questions 1 through 9?
(If not, try again—decision-making is a process. Unlike
entrepreneurs, directors can be granted Mulligans.
They can ask questions over and over again until the
entrepreneur gets it right!)
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